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ABSTRACT 
 
Brandon Chase Gorman: Pious Politics: Political Theology in the Arab World and Beyond 
(Under the direction of Charles Kurzman) 
 
In this dissertation, I investigate the correlates and contents of Islam-centered political ideas 
among individual Muslims using a combination of survey data, cognitive interview data, and text data 
gathered from Arabic-language online messageboards. In the Chapters 2 and 3, I find that Muslims tend 
to support shari'a law and other Islamist political values do not systematically object to liberal global 
norms like democracy and human rights. The fourth chapter builds on these findings by exploring how 
Muslims discuss these issues online using a combination of dictionary-based and unsupervised text 
classification techniques on a sample of 214,861 posts made on the Arabic-language messageboard 
majalisna.com. I find that posters on this messageboard take issue with global norms not because of the 
content of the norms themselves, but because of their relationship with the West and powerful global 
actors. These results 1) provide evidence that the divide between Islamists and non-Islamists in the 
Muslim world is not as stark as the scholarly literature would otherwise suggest and 2) show that the 
expansion of international institutions and global culture can lead to both isomorphism and 
differentiation in local attitudes and practices. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
On the afternoon of September 9th 2013, I hailed a taxi to take me home from an interview I was 
conducting in Sidi Bou Said, Tunisia. My conversation with the taxi driver took a predictable route – 
compliments on my Arabic, my knowledge of Islam, questions about my ethnoreligious heritage and my 
reason for being in Tunisia. The discussion of my dissertation topic – the relationship between shari’a 
and democracy – inevitably turned to an animated analysis of the situation in Tunisia since the 
revolution. Hands waving, the taxi driver enumerated a lengthy list of problems in the country: 
corruption, violence, infighting, rising prices, and a shortage of tourists. Intrigued, I probed – how will 
Tunisia solve all of these problems? My companion replied, “Of course you must know that God is the 
solution, faith is the solution, the answers are always in Islam.” I probed further, asking him to clarify. He 
responded, “First, we must have term limits so that politicians don’t become lazy and they work for the 
common good, and the laws must apply to politicians like everyone else. There should also be 
transparency in campaign financing, we have to know who is paying for these politicians,” and so on, 
without mentioning Islam, God, or faith again for the remainder of his half-hour monologue.  
I found this pattern repeated in other conversations. In early November, a man I met in a café 
told me that he supported the creation of a caliphate whose leader would be “elected, but not through 
democratic elections, through Islamic elections.” Other self-described Salafists told me similar things: 
elections should be replaced with shura (a Qur’anic term meaning “consultation”) and bei’a (allegiance), 
taxes should be replaced with analogous Islamic concepts, khums and jizya, and the civil state should be 
replaced with an Islamic one. Yet, despite these differences in terminology, respondents largely 
described slight reforms on existing policies and institutions when asked to clarify their stances. An 
Islamic Tunisia would still have elections, protect women’s and minority rights, be a safe place for 
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tourists, and have peaceful relations with its neighbors (in fact, these people argued, Tunisia would 
improve on all of these fronts). This phenomenon also permeated more mundane elements of life 
during my time in Tunisia. Tunisia’s first “Islamic restaurant” opened in Sousse in December 2013; it 
differs from “secular” restaurants in only two ways: the waitresses are all veiled and the dining area is 
divided into family-sized units by movable partitions that allow conservative women to feel comfortable 
removing their head coverings. 
This was not at all what I expected to find when I started my fieldwork, given the acrimonious 
and polarized public debate surrounding Islamism in the Arab world and around the world. Activists, 
politicians, and media outlets on both sides of the secular-Islamist divide depict the two sides as 
fundamentally incompatible, and this pessimism is echoed by scholars who depict Islamists as 
“ideological actors” that are committed, first and foremost, to realizing their vision of an Islamic moral 
and political order. The incongruence with my experience as a foreign researcher in Tunisia is what 
spurred the broad topic of this dissertation: what is Islamism and how and why do people invoke it? I 
explore these questions by adopting a broad and complementary set of data and methods. 
In Chapter 2, entitled “Global Boundary Inversion: International Organizations, Muslim Identity, 
and Shari’a Law,” I investigate Islamism as a form of boundary work targeted at international 
organizations and other powerful global actors that many perceive as indifferent or even hostile towards 
Muslims worldwide. Using a mixed-method design combining quantitative analyses of data from values 
surveys in twelve majority-Muslim countries with a qualitative analysis of data drawn from cognitive 
interviews I performed with fifty Tunisians between 2013 and 2014, I find that individuals who support 
shari’a law – one of the cornerstones of modern Islamist ideology – do not systematically object to the 
content of global and/or Western norms (e.g., democracy, human rights, environmentalism) as previous 
scholarship would suggest. Instead, I find that outspoken support for shari’a is one way for Muslims to 
take a public stance on the perceived historical mistreatment of Muslims and the delegitimization of 
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their political concepts in global culture. This suggests that the diffusion of global culture produces both 
isomorphism and differentiation, weakening some symbolic boundaries while strengthening and 
creating others. 
In Chapter 3, entitled “The Myth of the Secular-Islamist Divide in Muslim Politics,” I evaluate the 
notion that secularists and Islamists in the Muslim world are engaged in “culture wars” that pit 
fundamentally divergent ideological blocs against one another in a zero-sum contest for power. Using a 
mixed-method design combining analyses of data from the second wave of the Arab Barometer surveys 
and in-depth interviews with Tunisians, I find little evidence that Islamists are different from non-
Islamists in regards to attitudes about declaring others non-Muslims (takfir), popular sovereignty, 
women’s rights, or minority rights, though they are more likely to believe that democracy undermines 
Tunisian values and less likely to be tolerant of followers of other religions. Further, many of the 
“Islamic” political procedures advocated by Islamists bear striking resemblances to the secular 
procedures they seek to replace, and secularist respondents revealed in their interviews that they would 
potentially agree with many Islamist positions – such as applying shari’a – so long as their 
interpretations were implemented. By exploring the correlates and contents of Islamist and secularist 
ideologies at the individual level, this chapter shows that the so-called secular-Islamist divide in Muslim 
politics is not as deep or fundamental as it seems. 
Chapter 4, entitled “Islamism and Democracy in the Arab Online Public Sphere,” follows on the 
previous chapters using computational techniques to analyze discussion topics in 214,861 posts made 
on the Arabic-language messageboard majalisna.com. In this chapter, I employ two computer-assisted 
text classification techniques – unsupervised topic models using Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) and 
dictionary-based classification – to investigate when and how individuals discuss Islamism and 
democracy online. Results indicate two major findings: 1) Islamism-related concepts like shari’a law are 
relatively common and dispersed among a wide range of topics and 2) democracy and democracy-
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related concepts like elections tend to be clustered in explicitly political topics, and the people who 
discuss democracy are more likely to discuss international crises, conflicts, and conspiracy theories than 
those who do not. These results provide evidence in support of the previous two chapters by showing 
that the divide between Islamists and non-Islamists is not as stark as the scholarly literature would 
otherwise suggest and that democracy is a contentious topic among Arabic speakers because of its 
relationship with the West and powerful global actors. It is also among the first sociological studies to 
explore the content of the Arab Online Public Sphere (AOPS) by employing “big data” analysis 
techniques to Arabic-language text. 
Taken together, the results of the three remaining chapters in this volume help to explain my 
experience in Tunisia. Rather than a coherent and consistent ideology, Islamism is a flexible medium of 
identity. Individual Muslims invoke different Islamist principles – such as implementing shari’a law – or, 
alternatively, avoid invoking these principles, somewhat strategically. Identifying as a shari’a supporter 
suggests not that a given individual endorses strict draconian punishments but rather that they take 
issue with the powerful global actors that openly criticize it. Likewise, people who object to Islamist 
ideological concepts are not uniform in their objects, and will support these concepts when they are 
divorced from the substantive policy and social positions their most vocal advocates. Finally, those who 
reject liberal ideological concepts like democracy appear to do so not necessarily because they object to 
their practice, but rather because of their cultural association with Western and other foreign actors. As 
such, the chapters that follow provide scholarly contributions to the literatures on global cultural 
diffusion, political attitudes in the Muslim world, Islamism, and online deliberation in the developing 
world. 
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CHAPTER 2: GLOBAL BOUNDARY INVERSION: INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS,  
MUSLIM IDENTITY, AND SHARI’A LAW 
Introduction 
Shari’a, or Islamic law, was largely replaced by Western-style legal codes in the early twentieth 
century. Over the past few decades, however, it has been steadily reintroduced in majority-Muslim 
countries due in part to “the powerful… discourse surrounding it, which holds promises for the ‘ordinary 
people’” (Peters 2005:146). Today, support for shari’a is regarded by many Muslims as a litmus test for 
judging the cultural authenticity of social and political actors. After the 2011 uprising in Tunisia, for 
example, the Islamist Ennahda Movement’s decision to abandon their goal of implementing shari’a was 
met with backlash from pro-shari’a groups who denounced Ennahda for failing to be authentically 
Islamic (Torelli et al. 2012). Globally, however, the rise in the popularity of shari’a has become a point of 
contention, with Western countries, international organizations, and human rights activists often 
associating shari’a with stonings, floggings, forced marriages, and worse (Abiad 2008; Korteweg 2008). 
Nearly 79 percent of Muslim respondents to values surveys in majority-Muslim countries “agree” or 
“strongly agree” with implementing shari’a, and, as Figure 1 illustrates, support has increased since the 
early 2000s when researchers began collecting systematic data on the topic. This increasing support for 
shari’a alongside increasing criticism by international organizations and Western countries presents a 
puzzle for sociological theories of global cultural diffusion that predict coalescence around globally-
legitimated norms. 
I use the case of support for shari’a to investigate the relationship between perceived exclusion 
from global norm-making processes and reservations about international institutions and global culture. 
World polity theory, which posits that increasing connections via international organizations should lead   
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Figure 1: Percentage of Muslims Responding “Agree” or “Strongly Agree” with Survey Item on 
Implementing Shari’a in Eight Majority-Muslim Countries 
Sources: World Values Survey Wave 4 (1999-2004), Arab Barometer I (2006-2007), Arab Barometer II (2010-2011), 
Arab Barometer III (2012-2013). 
 
Note: Countries included are those with data for more than one time point; non-Muslims are dropped from the 
sample in all countries. This figure indicates that overall support for shari’a has risen across all countries in this 
time period with the exception of Egypt, where support has remained relatively flat. 
 
 
to global cultural isomorphism (Meyer et al. 1997), largely conceptualizes support for local cultural 
objects and practices as holdouts from this process (Barber 1995; Boyle and Carbone-López 2006; Boyle, 
McMorris, and Gómez 2002:26; Boyle and Meyer 1998:218–219). I contend that this phenomenon is 
better understood as a reaction to the exclusion of these cultural objects and practices from the 
repertoire of global norms, which can contribute to the formation of anti-global identity groups (Bail 
2008; Hannerz 1990; Lamont and Molnár 2002). Specifically, I argue that discourses propagated by 
international institutions characterize shari’a as illegitimate, prompting many Muslims to engage in 
“boundary inversion” (Wimmer 2008) – articulating discourses that celebrate shari’a and proclaim its 
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superiority to globally-legitimated sociopolitical configurations. Thus, Muslims may not choose to 
support shari’a because of its ideological content, but rather because they feel purposefully excluded 
from global norm-making. 
In what follows, I generate testable hypotheses about the determinants of support for shari’a 
drawn from previous research and boundary work theory. I test these hypotheses using a mixed-method 
design combining quantitative analyses of data from values surveys in twelve majority-Muslim countries 
with a qualitative analysis of data drawn from cognitive interviews I performed with fifty Tunisians 
between 2013 and 2014. Findings indicate: 1) a robust relationship between support for shari’a and 
reservations about international organizations and global actors and, 2) shari’a supporters explicitly 
frame their support in opposition to international organizations and actors irrespective of their attitudes 
toward the content of global norms and their personal understanding of shari’a. This suggests that 
support for alternatives to global norms is a reaction to, rather than a holdout from, global cultural 
diffusion. Further, results provide evidence that international institutionalization can lead not only to 
isomorphism but also to cultural differentiation. 
Boundaries and the World Polity 
World polity scholars argue that the spread of international organizations and their cultural 
norms – which include democracy, secularism, rationality, environmentalism, science promotion, 
women’s rights, and human rights – contribute to the decreasing relevance of cultural boundaries and 
increasing global homogenization of cultural practices (Beck, Drori, and Meyer 2012; Boli 2005; Bush 
2007; Frank, Hironaka, and Schofer 2000; Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2005; Longhofer and Schofer 2010; 
Meyer et al. 1997; Meyer and Jepperson 2000; Schofer 2004; Torfason and Ingram 2010). Meyer 
(2010:14) posits that the observed coalescence around global norms is not merely a mimetic process – 
instead, individuals eagerly conform to global culture because it appeals to “putatively universal 
principles.” However, universalist discourses require both in-groups and out groups and therefore are 
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often exclusionary (Anderson 1991; Edgell, Gerteis, and Hartmann 2006; Telles 2004). It is possible that 
the global-cultural appeal to universality contributes to cultural differentiation (Appadurai 1996; 
Hannerz 1996) and that, by legitimating certain practices as “global”, international institutions and their 
discourses implicitly delegitimate others (Halliday and Carruthers 2007:1140).  
It is also unclear to what extent the isomorphic tendencies described by world polity scholarship 
are the result of individuals’ assessments of global culture as universal. Recent studies have emphasized 
the boundaries in global institutional networks wrought by inequalities and global power dynamics 
(Beckfield 2003, 2010; Hagan et al. 2006; Hughes et al. 2009; Paxton et al. 2015). As a result of this 
stratification, the most powerful countries are the dominant producers and promoters of global norms 
(Cole 2006) which are either local cultural features presented as universal (Carruthers and Halliday 
2006:534) or are intended to alter policies and practices in weaker countries (Barrett, Kurzman, and 
Shanahan 2010). While some local actors attempt redefine global norms to match already-existing 
cultural features (Rinaldo 2013; Vasi 2007), they do so at their own peril – international institutions 
often subject relatively weak countries to exclusion from global norm-making (Halliday 2009) or public 
shaming (Halliday et al. 2010:90–93) for nonconformity. As a result, many countries adopt global norms 
not due to their intrinsic appeal but because they lack the resources to “opt out” (Boyle and Preves 
2000; Boyle et al. 2001). 
While some world polity scholarship identifies local culture as a potential site of resistance 
against cultural isomorphism, this implies that global norms are encountered by local groups with pre-
defined identities and cultures. Boundary work scholarship, on the other hand, suggests that identity 
groups result from a dialectical interplay between self-identification, or the process by which individuals 
form, articulate, and practice identities, and identification by external groups (Brubaker 2004; Wimmer 
2008:1005). These scholars posit that the external identifications of legitimacy-granting institutions, 
such as international organizations, are especially influential (Brubaker and Cooper 2000:15; Tilly 1998). 
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Thus, as international organizations become external identifiers of a given population, the imposition of 
their cultural norms changes that population’s identification process. Anthropologists have found, for 
example, that Amazonian Indians in Brazil (Conklin and Graham 1995) and Mayans in Guatemala 
(Warren 1998) both overcame internal divisions to form pan-indigenous identities in the wake of United 
Nations rainforest protection programs in the 1980s and 1990s. The authors argue that these groups 
produced novel self-identifications as a result of external identifications that lumped them together as 
“indigenous populations.” 
However, external identifications rooted in legitimacy-granting institutions are not automatically 
adopted by target populations and sometimes produces opposition to external identifiers (Scott 1990; 
Tilly 1998). This is particularly true in the contemporary era, where the prevalence of mass media 
ensures that disparaging representations “are quickly moved into local repertoires of irony, anger, 
humor, and resistance” (Appadurai 1996:7). Indeed, group identities often thrive on embattlement and 
cultural boundaries become more salient when repeatedly challenged by outsiders (Gurrentz 2013; 
Smith et al. 1998; Stein 2001). For instance, Boyle and Carbone-López (2006:441) found that the 
international push to eliminate female genital cutting was deemed offensive by local opponents of the 
practice because of its perceived hostility toward African culture. Likewise, historical studies have shown 
that local nationalisms take on anti-global overtones when groups are targeted or excluded by 
international organizations. Gelvin (1998) and Milton-Edwards and Farrell (2010) show how nationalist 
sentiments in Syria and Palestine identify international organizations as enemies as a result of these 
countries’ being defined as less-than-full members of the global community. Similarly, Ivković and Hagan 
(2006) found that Sarajevans became increasingly skeptical of the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia as a result of perceived marginalization in the tribunal process. 
Opposition to the cultural-symbolic hierarchy among members of marginalized groups can take 
many forms. Drawing on Bourdieu (1977, 1984) and Melucci (1989), some boundary work scholars argue 
10 
that individuals belonging to these groups can seek to change the meanings of boundaries by 
challenging the hierarchical ordering of the categories they create. Wimmer (2008:986) calls this process 
boundary inversion, wherein subordinate groups self-identify as a “chosen people” who are morally and 
culturally superior to dominant groups. Examples include “black power” (Morris 1999; Telles 2004), “red 
power” (Nagel 1995; Warren 1998), and other ethnicity-based minority movements in the Americas 
(Takezawa 1994) as well as the more subtle use of conspicuous consumption to cast black American 
culture as uniquely “hip” (Lamont and Molnár 2001). Scholars of Chinese foreign policy have noted a 
tendency for Chinese intellectuals and authorities to disparage the international system by calling for 
global “Sinicization” (Barmie 1996) epitomized by the slogan “only Chinese culture can save the world” 
(Zhao 1997:738); they have also noted that this discourse diminished as China became increasingly 
embedded in global institutional networks (Kent 2007). 
The political struggle over the status of the coca leaf illustrates global boundary inversion aimed 
at international organizations. This mild narcotic, which has been consumed for millennia in Andean 
countries (Bolin 1998), became a potent symbol for Bolivian identity in the 1990s and early 2000s during 
a period of UN and IMF crackdowns and crop substitution programs (García et al. 2004:438–444; Metaal 
2014:38). Scholars noted that disparaging external identifications targeting coca chewers and farmers 
were associated with local critiques of external identifiers. During his fieldwork in Bolivia, Grisaffi 
(2010:432–433) noted a mural on a state-owned building that read “…for us the coca leaf is the culture 
of our ancestors… to them it causes idiocy and insanity” and a common theme in Bolivian musical lyrics, 
that “if it was only legal… then the rest of the world would be able to benefit from this special leaf.” 
Bolivian president Evo Morales called the international criminalization of the coca leaf a “historical 
injustice” (United Nations 2006:34) and, echoing a refrain of coca supporters who depict it as a 
“panacea for world hunger” (Metaal 2014:42), characterized coca as a potential “alternative source of 
nutrition for the entire world” (Morales 2014). Similarly, I argue that global actors’ delegitimization of 
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shari’a results in boundary inversion, wherein Muslims increasingly support shari’a and elevate it as 
superior to the global culture from which it is excluded. 
Shari’a and Global Culture 
The word shari’a, which means “the path” in Arabic, is a non-codified legal system based in the 
Qur’an and the example of the life of the Prophet Muhammad (Esposito 2011) that has historically been 
open to many interpretations, leading to a wide variation in what constitutes shari’a (Coulson 1964; 
Halliday 2003). More contemporary Muslims have continued this trajectory of diverse interpretations: 
for Islamic fundamentalists such as Ḥasan al-Bannāʼ and Sayyid Quṭb, shari’a is a total institution that 
governs all realms of life and is defined in opposition to Western forms of governance (Al-Bannāʼ 1978; 
Quṭb 1990). Islamic modernists, by contrast, believe that shari’a should be kept out of public life but still 
consider it crucially important in the private sphere (Kepel 1994:13–23; Kurzman 2002). Still others 
interpret shari’a as intrinsically liberal, arguing that it demands human rights, women’s rights, and 
democracy (Kurzman 1998; Sadowski 2006). This suggests that support for shari’a does not inherently 
entail opposition to global norms. 
While shari’a was replaced by secular legal codes in most countries1 by the early 20th century 
(Hefner 2011), many studies indicate a resurgence in its popularity beginning in the 1970s and 
accelerating through the 1990s (Juergensmeyer 1993; Lawrence 1995; Roy 2006; Salvatore 1997). This 
era, which world polity scholars identify as the period of exponential expansion of global networks 
(Beckfield 2010; Koo and Ramirez 2009; Pubantz 2005), also saw the rise of Islam-based global 
institutions, such as the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, and the promotion of Islamic alternatives 
to global norms (Arjomand 2004). While historical contention over shari’a was largely restricted to 
struggles between religious and political elites (Feldman 2008:106), the late 20th century resurgence in 
                                                          
1 It is important to note that this shift was not complete – scholars have shown that shari’a remained in place in 
family law in many majority-Muslim countries (e.g., An-Naʻīm 2002; Charrad 2001). 
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its popularity was fueled, in part, by ordinary Muslims. Intensifying calls for implementing shari’a 
prompted Anwar Sadat to issue the 1980 amendment to the Egyptian constitution identifying it as a 
source of legislation (Ayubi 1980:486–490); Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq’s implementation of shari’a 
provisions in Pakistan during the 1970s and 1980s were met with substantial popular support (Kepel 
2002:100–101). This “return to Islam” was so pronounced that Palestinian historian Hisham Sharabi, 
who in 1966 wrote that Islam had “simply been bypassed” as a mobilizing ideology (1966:26), called 
Islamism “the dominant ideological force in Arab Society” thirteen years later (1979:97; see also: Lewis 
1979; Tessler 1980).  
Islamic concepts like shari’a have come under scrutiny within international organizations and in 
the international media, where they are often placed outside of the global legitimacy framework (Abiad 
2008). While this is part of a global ideological trend toward limiting the role of religion in politics 
(Casanova 1994), mainstream global discourses depict Islamic thought and practice as particularly “anti-
modern, fundamentalist, illiberal and un-democratic” (Casanova 2007:65). International organizations 
have characterized the Muslim world as a “desert of non-compliance” due in large part to provisions 
that refer to shari’a (Modirzadeh 2006:192) and have swiftly and unambiguously condemned its 
application, even when implemented democratically (Kendhammer 2013a; Nmehielle 2004) and the 
most sensationalized aspects of some shari’a-based penal codes – including floggings, amputations, and 
stonings – do not occur (Kendhammer 2013b). The office of the former High Commissioner for Human 
Rights Nevanethem Pillay reported that, even under ideal circumstances, shari’a is incapable of meeting 
“international standards of [judicial] fairness” (United Nations 2009:6–7). Even more benign discussions 
of shari’a among global actors tend to define it as illegitimate and backward: in a letter to the Security 
Council, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon noted with concern that wartime chaos was forcing Afghans 
to “revert” to shari’a (Ban 2008:7). The result, as described by An-Naʻīm, is that Muslims are exposed to 
“the constant propaganda that their tradition is inherently regressive or authoritarian” (2011:283). 
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Historical and qualitative studies suggest that the delegitimization of shari’a among world polity 
organizations has led some Muslims to seek to create an alternative global culture based on Islamic 
principles as they understand them. Since the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 
1948, for example, there have been various attempts, beginning with the Universal Islamic Declaration 
of Human Rights in 1981, to outline a specifically “Islamic” declaration of human rights, all of which 
emphasize the centrality of shari’a (Mayer 2007; Moosa 2000). A number of case studies similarly 
suggest that, in majority-Muslim countries, some individuals and organizations that work towards the 
implementation of global norms like women’s and human rights couch their interests in the framework 
of shari’a rather than (or in addition to) the language of international organizations (e.g., Kendhammer 
2013a:482; Salime 2011:37–39). This shows that shari’a supporters may adhere to the content of global 
norms while simultaneously avoiding identification with global norm-makers.  
Why Do Some Muslims Support Shari’a? 
Previous scholarship suggests a number of factors that may lead Muslims to support shari’a: 
religiosity, orthodoxy, demographics, opposition to the content of global culture, and boundary work 
resulting from domestic oppression. The current study theorizes an additional explanation – boundary 
inversion targeted at international institutions and other global actors. 
Religiosity 
One body of literature suggests that support for shari’a is an intrinsic feature of Islam and, thus, 
all Muslims should support shari’a, particularly more religious Muslims (e.g., Potrafke 2012). More 
recent studies, on the other hand, have found that religiosity is only loosely related to support for 
shari’a (Hoffman and Jamal 2012). 
Orthodoxy 
Moral cosmology theory suggests that political positions based on religion stem from beliefs 
relating to the source of moral authority (Davis and Robinson 1996, 1999, 2006; Ferguson et al. 2014; 
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Starks and Robinson 2005). This approach distinguishes between two fundamentally different 
conceptions of the role of God in the universe. Religious modernists, on the one hand, believe that 
individuals are the ultimate judges of morality and that God is largely a passive force in human existence 
(Starks and Robinson 2009:651). The religiously orthodox, by contrast, believe that God is the ultimate 
moral arbiter, that the revealed word of God is inerrant, and that God takes an active hand in shaping 
people’s daily lives (ibid.).  
This scholarship argues that orthodoxy, due to its God-centered orientation, is associated with 
conservative social attitudes, egalitarian economic attitudes, and skepticism about popular sovereignty 
(Blouin et al. 2013; Davis and Robinson 1999, 2006). According to this line of reasoning, individuals that 
display a high level of orthodoxy in their belief system (e.g., helping the poor as a religious requirement, 
strict adherence to scriptural rules, application of religious solutions to social problems) should be more 
likely to support shari’a, while individuals who have a strong commitment to popular sovereignty should 
be less likely to support shari’a. Indeed, much of the work in this area in majority-Muslim countries uses 
support for shari’a as a straightforward proxy for orthodoxy (e.g., Acevedo 2008; Davis and Robinson 
2006; Junisbai 2010; Moaddel and Karabenick 2008). 
Demographics 
If shari’a is a constitutive feature of a pre- or anti-modern Islamic ideology, support for it should 
be most prevalent among older and less educated individuals who are less likely to be exposed to global 
cultural trends (Boyle et al. 2002). On the other hand, demographic pressures might also lead Muslims 
to embrace shari’a as a solution to economic and political problems at the behest of political 
entrepreneurs. Many studies indicate that young men with a moderate amount of education are most 
likely to support shari’a (Blaydes and Linzer 2008; Ibrahim 1980; Tessler 1997).  
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Cultural Content 
Some scholarship conceptualizes religious political concepts like shari’a as components of a 
totalizing meaning system that inspires its adherents to axiomatically reject cultural innovation. For 
scholars in this area, religion “bolsters individuals’ acceptance of ‘traditional’ norms over the norms 
promoted by the international community, and Islam has served as a base of resistance to a number of 
global norms” (Boyle et al. 2002:16; see also: Boyle and Meyer 1998:218–219). The specific aspects of 
global culture that ostensibly run counter to shari’a range from abstract ideological principles such as 
individualism (Juergensmeyer 1993:191, 2008; Lawrence 1995), capitalism (Barber 1995; Mandaville 
2007:99), democracy (Ciftci 2012; Potrafke 2012), human rights (Kendhammer 2013a; Moosa 2000), and 
women’s empowerment (Charrad 2001:5; Fish 2011), to cultural objects including “fine arts, novels, 
[and] music” (Roy 2007:74). This suggests that individuals with ideological objections to the content of 
global norms are more likely to support shari’a. 
Boundaries 
Among the theoretical approaches that conceptualize the integration of religion and politics as a 
form of symbolic boundary work, subcultural identity theory suggests that individuals may endorse 
shari’a not out of religious obligation, but as a form of resistance against perceived marginalization in 
domestic culture and politics. Smith et al. (1998) argue that evangelicals, fundamentalists, and other 
religious subcultures in the United States thrive by drawing symbolic boundaries between their 
adherents and mainstream American culture. Thus, individuals may adopt Islamist discourses in 
response to unpopular domestic states’ hegemony over religious institutions and discourses (Hirschkind 
1997; Moaddel 2005:291; Tessler 1997). In addition, Tuğal’s (2009) study of Islamist communities in 
Turkey carving out identity spaces in opposition to mainstream, secular Turkish society suggests that, in 
majority-Muslim countries, shari’a supporters may be more likely to feel embattled or discriminated 
against.  
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Others posit that support for shari’a is a form of resistance against political, economic, and 
military domination at the hands of powerful external actors, such as the United States, that marginalize 
and subordinate Muslims in the international system (Ayoob 2005; Jamal 2012; Kepel 1994). Thus, 
support for shari’a is, in part, an outcome of powerful actors’ historical mistreatment of Muslims and 
backing of oppressive secular-autocratic domestic regimes, and supporting it “makes a clearly anti-
Western statement” (Peters 2005:145). This suggests that individuals who think that external forces are 
obstacles to reform and development in the Muslim world are more likely to support shari’a than those 
that do not. While this approach explicitly ties support for shari’a with global power dynamics, it focuses 
on state politics rather than international institutions and global norm-making processes. The current 
study additionally proposes that Muslims support shari’a as a form of boundary inversion targeted at 
international institutions whose discourses place Islamic political concepts outside the bounds of the 
global legitimacy framework. I hypothesize that many Muslims who support shari’a frame their support 
specifically in reference to international institutions. 
Methods and Data 
I use a mixed-method design to explore the relationship between support for shari’a and 
attitudes toward international institutions. First, I test for a statistical relationship between support for 
shari’a and key independent variables using ordinary least squares and ordered logistic regression 
models with country-level fixed effects. I analyze two sources of data: 1) the second wave2 of the Arab 
Barometer (AB) survey, which includes data on over 10,000 respondents across ten Arab countries – 
Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Tunisia, and Yemen – in 2010 and 2011 and, 
2) the fourth wave3 of the World Values Survey (WVS) with responses from approximately 8,000 
                                                          
2 Only the second AB wave contains survey items about a number of relevant independent variables, including 
orthodoxy, global norms (e.g., tolerance and women’s rights), and attitudes about the international community. 
 
3 Only the fourth WVS wave contains survey items about shari’a. 
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individuals across six majority-Muslim countries – Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Jordan, Nigeria, and 
Saudi Arabia – between 1999 and 2004.4  
I use qualitative results from fifty semi-structured interviews that I performed in Tunisia 
between August 2013 and March 2014 to validate findings from the quantitative analyses and examine 
the content of pro-shari’a attitudes. Most interviews were conducted in Tunisian Arabic, with a handful 
in English at the request of the respondent. I conducted the interviews using cognitive interviewing 
techniques, which involve asking respondents to answer a standard set of survey items along with open-
ended follow-up questions in order to provide insight into respondents’ perceptions of the survey items 
and the justifications for their answers (Miller 2014). I chose respondents using a combination of 
convenience and purposive sampling (Teddlie and Yu 2007) designed to capture the full range of support 
for shari’a among respondents, with self-identified Salafists5 oversampled. Respondents ranged in age 
from 22 to 64 years (mean=33.32), were 60% men (N=30) and 40% women (N=20), and the vast majority 
had or expected to acquire a college degree6 (80%, N=40). 
Cognitive interviewing is an ideal data collection method for this kind of analysis. Because 
interview questions were chosen from AB and WVS survey questionnaires, the resulting data provide 
insight into the content of pro- and anti-shari’a attitudes by allowing shari’a supporters and opponents 
to justify their answers in their own words (Gorman 2015). This allows me to: 1) ensure that the results 
of the quantitative analyses accurately reflect respondents’ cognitive schemas – a strategy that Small 
(2011) calls triangulation – and, 2) test the hypothesis that support for shari’a is tantamount to global 
                                                          
4 Non-Muslims are dropped from both samples. 
 
5 Salafism is an interpretation of Sunni Islam that forbids theological innovation and advocates adherence to the 
social structures that existed at the beginning of Islamic history. 
 
6 My sample is younger and more educated than the Tunisian population as a whole. According to the AB data, the 
mean age in Tunisia is 36.79 and roughly 38% have or expect to acquire a college degree. For the 20-30 year age 
range (62% of my sample), roughly 49% have or expect to acquire a college degree. 
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boundary inversion by evaluating whether shari’a supporters discursively elevate it as superior to global 
norms. The former is particularly important given the possibility that being interviewed by a foreign 
researcher may have influenced interviewees’ responses. 
Who Supports Shari’a? – Quantitative Data and Method 
Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable for the quantitative models is support for shari’a. For the AB data, I 
construct an index using four survey items presenting respondents with the statement that the 
government and parliament7 should enact: 1) laws in accordance with shari’a; 2) penal laws in 
accordance with shari’a; 3) personal status laws in accordance with shari’a and; 4) inheritance laws in 
accordance with shari’a, with responses ranging from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree” 
(Cronbach’s alpha = 0.8731). (See Appendix 1A for a list of indices drawn from both datasets and their 
related indicators). The resulting index is the sum of all individual indicators scaled to a theoretical range 
of 1-100, and any missing indicator results in a missing index score (N=1,036; roughly 9% of 
respondents).  
In the WVS data, there is only one survey item that deals with shari’a. It presents respondents 
with the statement “The government and parliament should implement only the laws of the shari’a,” 
with a five-item Likert response scale ranging from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree.” Figure 2 
presents the distribution of the dependent variables in both datasets and shows that, while shari’a is 
popular among Muslims, there is considerable variation in the responses: nearly 30% of respondents are 
ambivalent or opposed to its implementation. 
 
 
                                                          
7 In Saudi Arabia, all questions with the stem “The government and parliament…” are worded “The government 
and Shura Council…” 
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Figure 2: Histograms Describing Dependent Variables 
 
Note: The theoretical range for the support for shari’a index used in the AB data is 0-100; its empirical range is 25-
100. 
 
 
Religiosity 
For the AB data, I use two measures of religiosity. The first is self-reported religiosity8 with 
responses ranging from “religious” to “not religious.” The second is an additive religiosity index 
constructed from three survey items that assess how often the respondent watches or listens to 
religious programs on the radio or television, reads religious books, and listens to or reads the Qur’an 
with responses ranging from rarely9 to daily (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.7687); this index is z-standardized to 
                                                          
8 I include self-reported religiosity as a separate variable in models using both datasets for two reasons. First, the 
correlation between this variable and other measures of religiosity is relatively weak (range: 0.1062 to 0.3478). 
Second, scholarship on attitudes in majority-Muslim countries indicates that self-reports are not reliable indicators 
of religiosity in these contexts (e.g., Hoffman and Jamal 2012; Jamal and Tessler 2008). 
 
9 Because respondents were given the option to choose “never” in the Tunisian sample, I combined this option 
with “rarely.” 
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enhance comparability across independent variables. For the WVS data, I use responses to two survey 
items to measure religiosity: a binary variable that captures self-reported religiosity and an ordinal 
variable describing religious service attendance, with responses ranging from “never” to “more than 
once a week.” 
Orthodoxy 
To measure the doctrine component religious orthodoxy in the AB sample, I construct a z-
standardized additive index using responses to three survey items asking respondents to what extent 
helping the poor, public prayer, and not listening to music are criteria for individual piety, with 
responses ranging from to “absolutely irrelevant” to “to a great extent” (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.7047). In 
the WVS sample, I construct a z-standardized additive index using three binary variables that measure 
whether respondents believe that religious institutions have solutions to moral, social, and family 
problems (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.7539). According to previous research, religiously orthodox individuals 
should be also skeptical of popular sovereignty. I measure this aspect of orthodoxy10 through a survey 
item that asks respondents if they think laws should be made according to the people’s wishes, with 
responses ranging from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree.” These variables are identical in both the 
AB and WVS data, although in the WVS there is a neutral category on the response scale. 
Demographics 
In both datasets, I include three demographic variables. The first is age in decades. The second 
indicates if the respondent is female. The third measures level of education, coded 1 if the respondent 
                                                          
10 I include support for popular sovereignty as a separate variable in models because the correlation between this 
variable and the other orthodoxy variables is very weak (range: 0.0051-0.0424) and because some scholarship 
suggests that orthodoxy is unrelated to support for popular sovereignty (e.g., Pepinsky, Liddle, and Mujani 2012). 
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has at least some college. This variable was recoded due to differences in response categories between 
the datasets and across countries.11  
Cultural Content 
I measure individual attitudes about six global norms. In the AB data, I construct a z-
standardized index that measures support for women’s empowerment using five survey items that ask 
respondents whether they believe that women should be able to work outside the home, have the same 
employment opportunities as men, travel abroad, and assume judicial and ministerial positions 
(Cronbach’s alpha = 0.7996). I assess attitudes about democracy using a survey item12 that asks 
respondents whether they think that, despite its faults, democracy is better than any other political 
system, with responses ranging from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree.” I measure racial and 
religious tolerance using two binary variables that ask respondents if they would be comfortable having 
“people of a different race or color” or “followers of other religions” as neighbors.13 Finally, I construct a 
binary measure that captures whether the respondent is an association member, coded 1 if the 
respondent belongs to a union, charity, or non-governmental organization. 
In the WVS data, I construct a z-standardized index that measures attitudes toward women’s 
empowerment using two survey items that ask to what extent being a good mother and good wife are 
important traits for women (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.7947). As in the AB data, I assess attitudes about 
                                                          
11 In the AB dataset, for example, Tunisian respondents were presented a 6-item response scale while respondents 
in other countries were presented with a 7-item response scale. 
 
12 I use this question because it measures diffuse support for democracy in general rather than specific support for 
particular aspects of democracy, thus more accurately measuring support for democracy as an element of global 
culture. There is a similar question which asks respondents to what extent they think democracy is a “good” 
political system. Results of models using this alternative question are substantively very similar (not reported).  
 
13 While similar questions exist in the WVS data, I do not include them in models for two reasons. First, they were 
not asked to over 35% of respondents in the sample. Second, rather than prompting respondents to give their 
opinions about specific groups as in the AB survey, in the WVS respondents are asked if there are any people that 
they would not like to have as neighbors in an open-ended question. Because respondents are not prompted to 
think about specific groups, this variable likely measures exposure to, rather than tolerance for, dissimilar groups.  
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democracy via a survey item that asks respondents whether they think that, despite its faults, 
democracy is better than any other political system. I measure trust in science using a survey item that 
asks respondents whether they think scientific advances will harm or help mankind, with higher values 
associated with more pro-science responses. Finally, I measure individual support for environmentalism 
using a binary survey item that asks respondents whether they prioritize protecting the environment 
over economic growth. 
Boundaries 
To evaluate individual perceptions of domestic oppression, I use a survey item that asks 
respondents to what extent they feel they are treated equally to other citizens in their country, with 
responses ranging from “not at all” to “to a great extent.” 
To measure reservations about the international community in the AB data, I use five survey 
items. The first asks whether external calls for reform are illegitimate, recoded as a dummy variable with 
all “unacceptable” responses coded as 1. I employ this coding strategy because many of the responses 
categories do not discriminate between different intensities of attitudes but instead are justifications for 
choices (e.g., “unacceptable on principle” vs. “unacceptable because they are harmful to national 
interests”). The second item is a three-category variable that captures the respondent’s ideal level of 
openness to the outside world, with higher values indicating a preference for being more closed. The 
third variable is a binary measuring whether the respondent thinks that the Arab14 world is globally 
embattled, coded as 1 if the respondent answered the question “what is the most important challenge 
the Arab world currently faces?” with the response “curbing foreign interference.” The fourth measures 
feelings of global dependency, asking respondents whether or not foreign interference is an obstacle to 
reform in their countries. 
                                                          
14 Because the AB survey was conducted in Arab countries, this question asks only about the Arab world. 
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Because the WVS data contains survey items that ask for respondents’ opinions on the United 
Nations, I use these to measure reservations about international institutions directly. First, I use a 
question asking for the respondent’s confidence in the United Nations, with responses ranging from 
“none at all” to “a great deal”. Second, I construct a z-standardized index using questions that probe 
respondents’ feelings towards the UN in five policy areas: aid to developing countries, environmental 
protection, international peacekeeping, refugees, and human rights (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.6737). Higher 
scores indicate that the respondent believes the UN is justified in promoting policies in that area. Finally, 
in order to measure and control for feelings of Muslim identity, I constructed a dummy variable from a 
survey item that asks respondents “which of the following best describes you?” with the response 
“above all, I am a Muslim” coded as 1. 
Missing Data 
Missing data were imputed using iterative chained equations. I created five imputations per 
dataset and transformed all variables before imputing (Von Hippel 2009). To avoid perfect prediction 
problems when imputing categorical variables, I implemented an augmented-regression approach which 
adds observations with small weights to the data during estimation (White et al. 2010). Finally, before 
running models on the imputed data, I dropped any cases that had missing values on the dependent 
variable (Von Hippel 2007). 
Models 
For the AB data, I estimate linear regression models with country-level fixed effects to control 
for unobserved country-level effects. For individual i in country j, the model is: 
𝑌𝑖𝑗 = 𝑈𝑗 +  𝑋𝑖𝑗𝛽 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗  
Where 𝑌𝑖𝑗  is the support for shari’a index, 𝑋𝑖𝑗  is a matrix of individual-level covariates, β is a vector of 
coefficients, 𝑈𝑗  is a country-specific intercept term, and 𝜀𝑖𝑗  is an individual error term. For the WVS data, 
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because the dependent variable is ordinal, I estimate an ordered logistic regression model with country-
level fixed effects. For individual i in country j, the model is: 
𝐿𝑜𝑔 (
Pr (𝑌𝑖𝑗 ≤ 𝑚|𝑋)
Pr (𝑌𝑖𝑗 > 𝑚|𝑋)
) =  𝜏𝑚 −  𝑋𝑖𝑗𝛽 +  𝑈𝑗  
Where m is a category for the ordinal support for shari’a variable, τ is a cut point, 𝑋𝑖𝑗  is a matrix of 
individual-level covariates, β is a vector of coefficients, and 𝑈𝑗  is a country-specific constant term. While 
statistical literature indicates that the use of fixed effects in nonlinear regression models can produce 
inconsistent coefficients, this is only an issue when the number of observations per group is small. In the 
case of the WVS data, which has hundreds or thousands of observations per country, including country-
level fixed effects is appropriate (Hsiao 2014:196–205). As a robustness check, I also ran a series of 
linear regression models with country-level fixed effects, treating the categorical variable as continuous, 
with substantively similar results (see Appendix 1B). For both datasets, I include sampling weights to 
replicate nationally-representative samples. 
Who Supports Shari’a? – Quantitative Results 
Table 1 presents the results of the linear regression models using the AB data. Table 2 presents 
the results of the ordered logistic regression models using the WVS data. 
Religiosity 
All of the variables measuring religiosity are significantly and positively related to support for 
shari’a in all models across both datasets. 
Orthodoxy 
All of the variables measuring doctrinal orthodoxy are significantly associated with support for 
shari’a in the expected direction in all models across both datasets. The analysis shows inconsistent 
results for the association between support for popular sovereignty and shari’a, however: it is 
25 
significantly and negatively associated with support for shari’a in the AB data but positively associated 
with support for shari’a in the WVS data. 
Demographics 
The results for the demographic variables are inconsistent. Age has a negative association with 
support for shari’a in the AB model but fails to achieve statistical significance in the full WVS model. For 
sex and education, the results of the different datasets point in opposite directions – the AB models 
suggest that women and people with college educations are more likely to support shari’a while the  
WVS models suggest the opposite. These results cast doubt on the argument that support for shari’a is a 
pre-modern ideological holdover adopted by traditionalists and individuals with relatively little exposure 
to global culture. 
Cultural Content 
The results for the variables measuring attitudes toward global norms are also mixed. Consistent 
with previous literature, positive attitudes about women's empowerment are significantly and 
negatively associated with support for shari’a in all models across both datasets. Among the other 
variables, however, a different pattern emerges. In models using both datasets, support for democracy 
is positively and significantly associated with support for shari’a. While the coefficient for religious 
tolerance is negative and significant in the AB nested model, it loses its significance to the religiosity 
variables in the full model. The reverse is true for the racial tolerance variable, which is not significant in 
the nested model but is positively associated with support for shari’a in the full model. Belonging to a 
voluntary association is not a significant predictor of support for shari’a in any model. Both trust in 
science and environmentalism are positively and significantly associated with support for shari’a in both 
the WVS models. Taken together, these results indicate that support for shari’a does not necessarily 
entail a rejection of global culture; in fact, support for shari’a is associated with greater enthusiasm for 
certain global norms (e.g., democracy, scientism, and environmentalism).  
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Table 1: Fixed Effects Regressions on Support for Shari’a (Arab Barometer) 
 Religiosity Orthodoxy Demographics Cultural 
Content 
Boundaries Full 
Religiosity       
 Self-Reported 1.9456*** 
(0.3125) 
    1.7385*** 
(0.3124) 
 Religiosity Index 1.9111*** 
(0.2034) 
 
    1.4774*** 
(0.2118) 
Orthodoxy       
 Doctrine Index  2.7489*** 
(0.1889) 
   1.9809*** 
(0.1969) 
 Pop. Sovereignty  -0.5894** 
(0.1998) 
   -0.4875* 
(0.1969) 
 
Demographics 
      
 
 Age   -0.4303** 
(0.1529) 
  -0.7114*** 
(0.1496) 
 College   1.1690*** 
(0.3346) 
  1.1048*** 
(0.3279) 
 Female   1.5700*** 
(0.3221) 
  1.9543*** 
(0.3410) 
 
Cultural Content 
      
 Women Empowerment    -1.0731*** 
(0.1957) 
 -1.0555*** 
(0.2034) 
 Democracy    1.3027*** 
(0.2615) 
 1.5138*** 
(0.2515) 
 Religious Tolerance    -0.8407* 
(0.3744) 
 -0.1801 
(0.3623) 
 Racial Tolerance    0.7549 
(0.4272) 
 0.9003* 
(0.4224) 
 Association Member    0.7426 
(0.4026) 
 0.3577 
(0.3910) 
 
Boundaries 
      
 Domestic Oppression     -0.3505 
(0.1883) 
-0.0706 
(0.1795) 
 Closed to IC     0.6846*** 
(0.2140) 
0.4221* 
(0.2065) 
 IC Illegitimate     0.8335* 
(0.3754) 
0.9608** 
(0.3625) 
 Globally Embattled     0.8571* 
(0.4368) 
0.9411* 
(0.4301) 
 Dependency     1.5495*** 
(0.1954) 
 
1.1107*** 
(0.1965) 
Constant 79.0260*** 
(0.9285) 
84.6180*** 
(0.8552) 
82.4067*** 
(0.8624) 
78.1143*** 
(1.1384) 
78.0430*** 
(0.9664) 
73.9818*** 
(1.7615) 
N 11006 11006 11006 11006 11006 11006 
r2 0.2835 0.2860 0.2684 0.2708 0.2726 0.3148 
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 
 
Note: Reported r2 is the mean value across all imputed datasets. 
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Table 2: Ordered Logistic Regressions with Country-Level Fixed Effects on Support for Shari’a (World 
Values Survey) 
 Religiosity Orthodoxy Demographics Cultural 
Content 
Boundaries Full 
Religiosity       
 Self-Reported 0.7166*** 
(0.0843) 
    0.5339*** 
(0.0861) 
 Mosque Attendance 0.0466*** 
(0.0085) 
    0.0433*** 
(0.0089) 
 
Orthodoxy 
      
 
 Doctrine Index  0.2041*** 
(0.0242) 
   0.2053*** 
(0.0251) 
 Pop. Sovereignty  0.1463*** 
(0.0235) 
   0.1374*** 
(0.0239) 
 
Demographics 
      
 Age   0.0405* 
(0.0164) 
  0.0217 
(0.0166) 
 College   -0.1771*** 
(0.0545) 
  -0.1794*** 
(0.0559) 
 Female   0.1099* 
(0.0435) 
  -0.1177* 
(0.0464) 
 
Cultural Content 
      
 Women Empowerment    -0.2511*** 
(0.0250) 
 -0.2344*** 
(0.0260) 
 Democracy    0.1229** 
(0.0378) 
 0.1331*** 
(0.0369) 
 Trust in Science    0.1294*** 
(0.0374) 
 0.0771* 
(0.0387) 
 Environmentalism    0.1423** 
(0.0458) 
 0.1289** 
(0.0462) 
 
Boundaries 
      
 UN Confidence     -0.0725** 
(0.0237) 
-0.0934*** 
(0.0252) 
 UN Policy Index     -0.0744*** 
(0.0233) 
-0.0626** 
(0.0243) 
 Muslim Identity     0.4661*** 
(0.0503) 
0.4724*** 
(0.0516) 
       
Cutpoint 1 -1.0244*** 
(0.1103) 
-1.4227*** 
(0.1212) 
-1.9111*** 
(0.0879) 
-1.2071*** 
(0.1843) 
-2.0877*** 
(0.1066) 
-0.2854 
(0.2380) 
Cutpoint 2 0.0932 
(0.1062) 
-0.2981* 
(0.1174) 
-0.7979*** 
(0.0842) 
-0.0847 
(0.1828) 
-0.9665*** 
(0.1018) 
0.8646*** 
(0.2364) 
Cutpoint 3 1.0205*** 
(0.1071) 
0.6333*** 
(0.1183) 
0.1246 
(0.0839) 
0.8492*** 
(0.1833) 
-0.0353 
(0.1015) 
1.8261*** 
(0.2373) 
Cutpoint 4 2.3608*** 
(0.1010) 
1.9751*** 
(0.1218) 
1.4544*** 
(0.0870) 
2.1974*** 
(0.1862) 
1.3054*** 
(0.1025) 
3.2159*** 
(0.2400) 
N 7932 7932 7932 7932 7932 7932 
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 
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Boundaries 
The variable measuring feelings of domestic oppression was not statistically significant in any AB 
model. This suggests that shari’a supporters do not feel more embattled by domestic actors than 
individuals who do not support shari’a.  
In contrast with the inconsistent effects of attitudes toward specific global norms, all of the 
models suggest that support for shari’a is associated with skepticism about the role of the international 
community. The AB models indicate that individuals who believe external calls for reform are 
illegitimate, would like to be more closed to the outside world, feel as though foreign influence is the 
biggest problem in the Arab world, and believe that foreign interference is an obstacle to reform are 
more likely to support shari’a. The coefficients show that, holding the other variables constant at their 
means, a respondent with the least supportive attitudes towards the international community scores 
approximately 7% higher on the dependent variable than one with the most supportive attitudes. Figure 
3 illustrates this association, falling between the effect of orthodoxy and religiosity. 
Results of the WVS models indicate that individuals who express confidence in the UN in general 
as well as in specific policy areas are less likely to support shari’a. The variable measuring Muslim 
identity is significant in the anticipated direction: respondents who see themselves as Muslims above all 
are more likely support implementing shari’a. Figure 4 illustrates the results of the ordinal logistic 
regression model (Table 2) by showing the predicted probabilities of belonging to each category of the 
dependent variable given high and low values of independent variables measuring religiosity, orthodoxy, 
and boundaries with other variables held constant at their means. The figure shows that respondents 
who have reservations about the UN are over 13% more likely to “strongly agree” with implementing 
shari’a than respondents who are not: higher than the effect of Muslim identity (approximately 11%), 
similar to the effect of orthodoxy (approximately 14%), and lower than the effect of religiosity 
(approximately 19%). Figure 5 recasts this finding as the predicted probability that a respondent will 
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“agree” or “strongly agree” with implementing shari’a given high and low values of the key groups of 
independent variables.  
Figure 3: Cumulative Effects of Independent Variables on Support for Shari’a Index (Arab Barometer) 
 
Note: This figure compares the cumulative effect of moving from the lowest to highest values for each set of 
statistically significant independent variables on the 1-100 support for shari’a index with 95% confidence intervals. 
For global boundaries, this figure illustrates the cumulative effect of moving from the most supportive attitudes 
toward the international community to the least supportive attitudes. The popular sovereignty component of 
orthodoxy is excluded because it has inconsistent effects. 
 
 
These results provide evidence that support for shari’a is associated with reservations about 
international institutions and the international community broadly construed. With the exception of 
attitudes toward women’s empowerment, results of models from both datasets demonstrate that 
shari’a supporters do not systematically object to the content of global norms. Similarly, the models 
show that demographic indicators are inconsistently associated with support for shari’a, calling into 
question arguments that theorize it as a component of an anti-modern ideology.  
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Figure 4: Cumulative Effects of Independent Variables on Predicted Probabilities of Ordinal Support 
for Shari’a Variable (World Values Survey) 
 
Note: This figure compares the cumulative effect of moving from the lowest to highest values for each set of 
statistically significant independent variables on the probability of belonging to each category of the support for 
shari’a variable. The global boundaries group is reverse coded: “low” indicates a positive attitude toward the UN 
and “high” indicates a negative attitude. The popular sovereignty component of orthodoxy is excluded because it 
has inconsistent effects. 
 
 
Why Do Some Muslims Support Shari’a? – Qualitative Data, Method, and Results 
The cognitive interviews, in which respondents were asked to justify their responses to closed-
ended survey questions about implementing shari’a, did not contain any questions about international 
organizations because they were designed to gather data on how respondents understand the 
relationship between shari’a and democracy. Discussions of international organizations and global 
culture, however, emerged in many of the interviews as respondents justified their support for shari’a 
or lack thereof. Figure 6 shows that the distribution of interview respondents on the support for shari’a 
measure is similar to that of the AB and WVS datasets, although not quite as left skewed. To analyze the 
content of these interview data, I employ a coding scheme that groups respondent justifications into 
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Figure 5: Cumulative Effects of Independent Variables on Predicted Probabilities of “Agree” or 
“Strongly Agree” Responses to Ordinal Support for Shari’a Variable (World Values Survey) 
 
Note: This figure compares the cumulative effect of moving from the lowest to highest values for each set of 
statistically significant independent variables on the probability of belonging to the “agree” or “strongly agree” 
categories of the support for shari’a variable with 95% confidence intervals. The global boundaries group is reverse 
coded: “low” indicates a positive attitude toward the UN and “high” indicates a negative attitude. The popular 
sovereignty component of orthodoxy is excluded because it has inconsistent effects. 
 
 
one or more of the four following substantive categories: religiosity, orthodoxy, domestic boundary 
work, and global boundary work; approximately 54% of my respondents who supported implementing 
shari’a invoked global boundary work (see Appendix 1D for example excerpts and more information 
about category prevalence). 
While respondents who supported shari’a defined it in myriad ways, a common thread ran 
through all of their justifications: Muslim identity. Ali, who “agreed” with implementing shari’a, said: 
We can’t say that the government must implement the laws of the shari’a. It’s not obligatory. 
But it is preferable that the government makes laws according to the shari’a because we are in a 
Muslim state and Islam has historically been our religion. (36, retail store manager, Kairouan) 
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Even some respondents that disagreed with the survey item about implementing shari’a, when asked to 
justify their answers, responded that they actually did support shari’a. Rym, a 29 year old college 
student living in Tunis who disagreed with the closed-ended question about implementing shari’a, 
justified her response by saying she was afraid of an Iranian-style political system but insisted: “I can’t be 
against shari’a, because I’m Muslim.” Rym and others like her saw shari’a as a central, but contested, 
aspect of Muslim identity. 
Figure 6: Distribution of Interview Responses for Support for Shari’a Item 
 
Note: This figure describes responses to the support for shari’a item included in the qualitative interview 
questionnaire (“The government and parliament should enact laws in accordance with the shari’a”), taken 
verbatim from the Arab Barometer Survey. 
 
 
Consistent with my hypotheses, many shari’a supporters expressed feelings that Muslims are 
globally embattled not only by powerful Western countries, but also by international organizations. 
Salim was keen to criticize international organizations for their perceived hypocrisy: 
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Concerning associations that look after human rights, that look after the rights of Christians and 
secular minorities, those associations urgently apply pressure to protect these people’s rights, 
but when it comes to the rights of Muslim people who are killed by the millions in Myanmar-
Burma, Iraq, and other countries, we don’t see any action. (28, electrician, Bizerte) 
Faisal, a 29-year-old auto mechanic from Bizerte, performs global boundary work when he 
rejects democracy, arguing that it “is used for the geostrategic interests of the American empire and its 
proxies like… NGOs and the UN.” Chokri saw the world similarly: 
The American empire is struggling against China, but both consider Islam the greatest threat, a 
sleeping giant. They want to be careful not to awaken the theory of shari’a. They want to isolate 
Islam until it becomes nothing more than a failed political project. (29, college student, Tunis) 
He was suspicious of the United States and China, and thought that Islam and “the theory of shari’a” 
were under attack from both. 
Interview results also provide evidence that Muslims who express support for shari’a are 
engaging in global boundary inversion, elevating shari’a above international actors and global culture. 
Omar, a well-known shari’a advocate who “strongly agreed” with its implementation, lamented: 
What is happening in England [after the financial collapse] is that their banks use Islamic finance 
now. You are using shari’a only for economics. Why don’t you use it in social relations and 
politics? Because you think with your pockets, and you only want to gain money! (64, retired, 
Bizerte) 
Later in our conversation, Omar described the interaction between Muslims and the outside 
world in terms of the eternal struggle between God and Satan: 
Satan told God that he would lead people astray from the truth and destroy them, and this is 
what is happening. Tunisian students go to Russia or the US or some other country and learn 
things, then they come back to apply the Russian or American life here in Tunisia. This is why we 
have so many ideologies, secularists, communists, rightists, leftists. But the Muslim culture is 
better than all of those cultures and ideologies, and this is what the shari’a embodies. (64, 
retired, Bizerte) 
Although many shari’a supporters said that they objected to the content of Western or global 
culture, the specific content to which they objected varied widely. While Omar elevated shari’a above 
both globally-legitimated neoliberal financial practices and political systems, Ibrahim, a self-described 
Salafist who “strongly agreed” with implementing shari’a, critiqued individualism: 
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A lot of international organizations come to Tunisia and they are surprised about the degree of 
altruism and hospitality of the Tunisian people. In Arab countries you can find people who are 
starving, but they will still give you food. If you go to Europe, nobody will give you anything. This 
is inhuman! (25, shop owner, Bizerte). 
There were strong indications, however, that he did not object to this “inhuman” culture in its 
entirety: Ibrahim owns a movie shop that primarily sells American and European media; during our 
interview, he was dressed in expensive and fashionable European clothing rather than the plain qamis 
(robe) often attributed to Salafists. This suggests that shari’a supporters may be more unified in their 
objection to the actions of dominant global norm-makers than to the content of global culture. 
Finally, many respondents who opposed implementing shari’a justified their opposition in terms 
of international legitimacy. Seif, a 28-year-old college student living in Tunis responded that a system 
based on shari’a would be very bad because “democracy is the internationally legitimate political 
system,” going on to say that shari’a is too “irrational” and “emotional” to be appropriate in the 
contemporary era of “objective rationality.” Manel, a medical doctor employed by an INGO who 
vehemently opposed implementing shari’a, said that she would support an Islamist politician only: 
…if he had a progressive interpretation of shari’a that did not contradict international law and 
universal values. If someone gave me that kind of interpretation of shari’a, I wouldn’t see him as 
a religious person. I would see him as a universal human being who is applying the universal 
values of humanity. (54, medical doctor, Sfax) 
Others expressed concern that applying shari’a would endanger Tunisia’s status in the 
international community. Rym, for example, was concerned that applying shari’a would damage 
Tunisia’s “good relations with all of the countries in the Mediterranean basin.” 
Results of the qualitative analyses suggest that the statistical correlation between support for 
shari’a and reservations about the international community and international organizations established 
in the quantitative models reflects a global boundary inversion process. People who indicated support 
for shari’a on the closed-ended survey questionnaire linked this support with skepticism about 
international organizations and their most powerful members in their own discourses. Further, my 
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results show that respondents who opposed implementing shari’a justified their position in reference to 
their support of international organizations and powerful global actors by attributing universality to 
their discourses. 
Discussion and Conclusion 
Previous world polity scholarship has suggested that popular support for shari’a is an 
idiosyncratic holdout from the processes that produce global cultural isomorphism. Scholars in this area 
argue that Islam provides Muslims with an “alternative meaning system” whose tenets are intrinsically 
at odds with global norms (Boyle et al. 2002:26). The current study proposes that support for shari’a 
does not imply an ideological clash between Islam and secular modernism but rather is associated with 
feelings of exclusion and marginalization from global norm-making processes. My findings support this 
claim – results of quantitative models suggest that religiosity and orthodoxy, both proxies for holding an 
explicitly “Islamic” meaning system, are significant, but not exhaustive, predictors of support for shari’a. 
While shari’a supporters tend to be less than enthusiastic about women’s empowerment, results of 
both the quantitative and qualitative analyses show that they do not appear to see a contradiction 
between shari’a and a host of other global norms including democracy, religious and racial tolerance, 
trust in science, and environmentalism. Instead, it appears that shari’a supporters take issue with the 
way that international organizations and other powerful global actors neglect and marginalize Muslims: 
quantitative results indicate that individuals who hold reservations about the international community 
and international organizations are significantly more likely to support shari’a and qualitative results 
show that many respondents linked their support for shari’a with distrust for international organizations 
and their most powerful members. 
These findings support the argument that many Muslims embrace shari’a as a boundary 
inversion strategy, attempting to redefine the global cultural-symbolic hierarchy and place themselves 
and their political concepts at its apex. In an international environment that has consistently kept 
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majority-Muslim societies in subordinate positions since the mandate era of the League of Nations and 
continues to delegitimate shari’a and other Islamic political concepts, many Muslims conceptualize 
shari’a as a historically-situated boundary marker rather than a coherent ideology. Outspoken support 
for shari’a is thus one way of taking a stance on the perceived historical mistreatment of Muslims and 
the delegitimization of their political concepts in global culture. This is similar to Kurzman’s (2011) 
finding that many people who expressed support for Osama bin Laden in the wake of the 9/11 attacks 
shared his perception that Muslims have been historically victimized by the United States but not his 
political ideology. In order to verify the causality of this relationship, future research may take an 
experimental approach, exposing some individuals to negative messages about shari’a drawn from 
global discourses to determine the effect of this exposure on attitudes. 
World polity scholarship has empirically demonstrated that the spread of global culture 
diminishes the importance of cultural and political boundaries. Yet, while Meyer et al. (1997) point out 
that normative prohibitions are central to global culture and Halliday et al. (2010) have shown that 
international organizations publicly shame nonconforming actors, scholars in this area do not explicitly 
consider that, in specifying the elements of global legitimacy, international organizations define certain 
groups and practices as outside of its bounds. By bringing boundary work literature to bear on global 
culture diffusion processes, the current study proposes that negative exemplars – like shari’a – are 
fundamental components of global culture and that international organizations and other global norm 
makers define global legitimacy in reference to these illegitimate concepts and practices. Future 
research might investigate the mechanisms by which local cultural objects and practices become 
institutionalized as negative exemplars in global culture. 
We already know that people elevate cultural objects in response to external identifications that 
challenge their legitimacy. This insight is often overlooked when it comes to global culture, where 
isomorphism is commonly depicted as a foregone conclusion. Meyer (2010:12), for example, writes that 
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global culture is so universally appealing that “Third World national states most avidly sacrifice their 
traditional cultural identities and adopt… models reflecting standard global values” with “voluntaristic 
eagerness.” Even scholars who recognize the unevenness of and contention around the spread of global 
culture tend to assume that local holdouts will eventually “be pulled in the direction of the global” 
(Carruthers and Halliday 2006:573). The present study shows that support for shari’a in majority-Muslim 
countries is not an idiosyncratic holdout to the processes that produce global cultural isomorphism but 
is, instead, partially a product of those processes. This suggests that the diffusion of global culture 
produces both isomorphism and differentiation, weakening some symbolic boundaries while 
strengthening and creating others. 
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CHAPTER 3: THE MYTH OF THE SECULAR-ISLAMIST DIVIDE IN MUSLIM POLITICS 
Introduction 
On the afternoon of September 9th 2013, I hailed a taxi to take me home from an interview I was 
conducting in Sidi Bou Said, Tunisia. My conversation with the taxi driver took a predictable route – 
compliments on my Arabic, my knowledge of Islam, questions about my ethnoreligious heritage and my 
reason for being in Tunisia. The discussion of my dissertation topic – the relationship between shari’a 
and democracy – inevitably turned to an animated analysis of the situation in Tunisia since the 
revolution. Hands waving, the taxi driver enumerated a lengthy list of problems in the country: 
corruption, violence, infighting, rising prices, and a shortage of tourists. Intrigued, I probed – how will 
Tunisia solve all of these problems? My companion replied, “Of course you must know that God is the 
solution, faith is the solution, the answers are always in Islam.” I probed further, asking him to clarify. He 
responded, “First, we must have term limits so that politicians don’t become lazy and they work for the 
common good, and the laws must apply to politicians like everyone else. There should also be 
transparency in campaign financing, we have to know who is paying for these politicians,” and so on, 
without mentioning Islam, God, or faith again for the remainder of his half-hour monologue.  
I found this pattern repeated in other conversations. In early November, a man I met in a café 
told me that he supported the creation of a caliphate whose leader would be “elected, but not through 
democratic elections, through Islamic elections.” Other self-described Salafists told me similar things: 
elections should be replaced with shura (a Qur’anic term meaning “consultation”) and bei’a (allegiance), 
taxes should be replaced with analogous Islamic concepts, khums and jizya, and the civil state should be 
replaced with an Islamic one. Yet, despite these differences in terminology, respondents largely 
described slight reforms on existing policies and institutions when asked to clarify their stances. An 
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Islamic Tunisia would still have elections, protect women’s and minority rights, be a safe place for 
tourists, and have peaceful relations with its neighbors (in fact, these people argued, Tunisia would 
improve on all of these fronts). This phenomenon also permeated more mundane elements of life 
during my time in Tunisia. Tunisia’s first “Islamic restaurant” opened in Sousse in December 2013; it 
differs from “secular” restaurants in only two ways: the waitresses are all veiled and the dining area is 
divided into family-sized units by movable partitions that allow conservative women to feel comfortable 
removing their head coverings. 
In this paper, I argue that opinions about the relative appropriateness of religious actors, 
institutions, and values in politics represent an important source of social division in majority-Muslim 
societies, but that this division is not as deep as previous scholarship, drawn largely from analyses of 
political parties and other formal organizations, suggests. To investigate this phenomenon, I used a 
mixed-method design combining quantitative analyses of data from the second wave of the Arab 
Barometer survey and qualitative data drawn from in-depth cognitive interviews with fifty Tunisians on 
the topic of religious involvement in politics. Contrary to expectations that these differences apply 
across a wide variety of social and political attitudes, results show that substantive differences are 
limited to relatively few issue areas and that self-identified secularists and Islamists both incorporate 
elements of their opponents’ ideologies in their attitudes and discourses. 
The Secular-Islamist Divide 
Images of the Muslim world as polarized into warring camps with irreconcilable views on the 
appropriate place for religion in politics abound. In Tunisia after the Arab Spring, for example, leaders of 
Islamist and secularist political parties depict one another as fundamentally flawed. The following 
quotes from Mohamed Kilani, the president of the Tunisian Socialist Party, and Rached al-Ghannouchi, 
the president of the Tunisian Islamist Ennahda Movement, illustrate this tendency: 
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The Islamists want to further their project by any means necessary, but the leftist 
democratic forces stand united in opposition to them. We want to highlight this conflict 
in order to defend democracy and freedom of speech. (Kilani 2013) 
What we call political Islam has demonstrated great heroism in the face of the horrible, 
monumentally spiritually impoverished nature of the so-called liberals, modernists, and 
progressives. (al-Ghannouchi 2013) 
Domestic, regional, and international media likewise tend to reference the seemingly-irreconcilable gulf 
between secularists and Islamists in the Muslim world. Recent headlines include: “What Middle East 
Moderates?” (Zakaria 2014), “In Tunisia, the Secularists Win” (Portes 2014), “Iraqis Open Vote for 
Parliament: An Islamist-Secular Split is Seen” (Filkins 2005), “In Tunisia after Arab Spring, Islamists’ New 
Freedoms Create New Muslim Divide” (Fisher 2012).  
Scholars have also tended to portray Muslims as divided along these lines. Much scholarship on 
politics in the Muslim world tends to focus on Islamist political parties and radical Islamist organizations 
that capitalize on the recent global resurgence of religion by projecting themselves as protectors of 
Islamic morality and an alternative to failed secular ideologies (Gorski and Altınordu 2008; 
Juergensmeyer 2008; Lawrence 1995; Roy 1994). These groups are largely seen as “ideological actors” 
that are committed, first and foremost, to realizing their vision of an Islamic moral and political order 
(Schwedler 2006). While some of the more flexible Islamist groups are willing to cooperate with non-
Islamists, many scholars argue that they only appear to alter their ideologies in attempts to gain power 
(Karakaya and Yildirim 2013; Yildirim 2012) and that this cooperation is contingent on secular groups’ 
willingness to avoid confrontation on “red line” issues such as gender equality and implementation of 
Islamic shari’a law (Browers 2009; Schwedler and Clark 2006; Tezcur 2009; Wickham 2004). However, 
scholars in this area are careful to point out that most contemporary Islamist groups have relatively 
moderate political ideologies (Bayat 2007a; Kurzman and Naqvi 2010; Mandaville 2007; Nasr 2005; 
Schwedler 2006). 
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While scholarship on Islamist political organizations abound, there is relatively little work on the 
potential constituencies of these groups, an omission that has serious consequences since constituent 
preferences may drive ideology and Islamist parties and organizations are likely competing for the same 
mass base (Schwedler 2013; Tezcur 2009; Wickham 2011:222). What little work has been done in this 
area has come to widely different conclusions. Some argue that voters may be more conservative than 
the Islamists who seek to represent them (e.g., Hamid 2011:72); critics counter that the “Islamist 
electorate” is willing and able to change its attitudes on particularly divisive issues like women’s rights 
(e.g., Catalano 2013). Others point out that Islamist groups have “attracted support from large groups of 
people who may not be particularly pious” (Sadowski 2006:227; see also: Pepinsky, Liddle, and Mujani 
2012), but may instead adopt Islamist orientations instrumentally (Blaydes and Linzer 2008). Lynch 
(2007) depicts the secular-Islamist divide as relatively shallow by showing that individual Islamist and 
secular bloggers are often able to find common ground in online spaces. 
It is possible that the scholarly and popular focus on divergent Islamist and secularist ideologies 
and the relative lack of studies examining Islamist constituencies are related. In US-focused political 
science, scholars on partisan polarization have come to the conclusion that polarization among political 
elites obscures the cross-ideological agreement on most social and policy issues at the mass level 
(Fiorina and Abrams 2008; Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope 2011; Mason 2013, 2015). It is plausible that the 
same mechanism is at work in majority-Muslim polities, with most people agreeing on most issues but 
disagreeing on relatively few symbolic and highly divisive “takeoff issues” (Baldassarri and Bearman 
2007:808). This paper investigates this phenomenon in the Muslim world by focusing on the attitudes of 
non-elite individuals (Browers 2009), broken out by issue-position (Clark and Schwedler 2003). I posit 
that in majority-Muslim societies, as in the US case, polarization may be more extreme among political 
elites acting as political entrepreneurs than among their potential constituents. 
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Polarization, Political Identity, and Islamism 
The idea of a sharp divide between secularists and Islamists in the Muslim world implies an 
environment of deep political polarization, or the separation of society into sharply opposing camps 
with fundamentally divergent views. Scholars have identified two indicators of polarization. The first is 
that attitudes and political identities should be distributed bimodally, with most people taking extreme 
positions and very few holding moderate, middle-ground positions (Abramowitz and Saunders 2008; 
Baldassarri and Bearman 2007; Baldassarri and Gelman 2008; Fiorina and Abrams 2008). In the context 
of majority-Muslim societies, a polarization approach would lead us to expect wide variation on issues 
like the establishment of an Islamic state, which is considered by many to be the most extreme form of 
Islamism (Ayoob 2004; Feldman 2008; Nasr 2005; Roy 1994; Sutton and Vertigans 2006). Most people 
should hold intense pro- or anti-Islamic state attitudes with relatively few people holding moderate or 
conciliatory attitudes. 
The second indicator of polarization is constraint, or consistency of attitudes and social 
identities among competing groups (Abramowitz and Saunders 2008; Baldassarri and Gelman 2008; 
Fiorina and Abrams 2008; Perrin, Roos, and Gauchat 2014). In the context of majority-Muslim societies, 
the assumption of polarization leads to two expectations. First, attitudes and identities related to 
Islamism, such as support for an Islamic state, support for implementing shari’a law, preferring Islamist 
political parties to secular political parties, preference for direct clerical involvement in politics, and 
feeling that piety is a desirable characteristic in politicians, should be consistently related to one another 
(Ibrahim 1980; Moaddel and Karabenick 2008; Tibi 2013). Second, reservations about potentially divisive 
takeoff issues, like liberal democracy (Filali-Ansary 1996; Gurses 2014; Lewis 1996), women’s 
empowerment (Ismail 2003; Schwedler and Clark 2006), and the rights of non-Muslims (Collins and 
Owen 2012; Schwedler 2011; Yeʼor 2002), should be consistently associated with Islamists and not 
associated with secularists. 
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While most work on Islamist political parties and organizations shows that there is ideological 
polarization among these groups and their secularist rivals, there are reasons to question whether this 
level of polarization exists at the individual level. In the US context, polarization is deeper among 
political elites than among individuals (Abramowitz and Saunders 1998; Fiorina et al. 2011; Fischer and 
Mattson 2009) and people experience and report attitudinal polarization despite its absence (Baldassarri 
and Bearman 2007; Mason 2013, 2015); there is little reason to think that this does not apply in the 
Muslim world. Likewise, experiences of political polarization are exacerbated by exposure to explicitly 
partisan news media (Levendusky 2013a, 2013b), which has increased in many countries, including 
Tunisia, in the aftermath of the Arab Spring (el-Issawi 2011). Where polarization does exist, we would 
expect it to be most pronounced among committed partisans, as they are more likely to be exposed to 
partisan media and to “opt in” to the consistent package of attitudes and behaviors promoted by 
political elites and fellow partisans (DellaPosta, Shi, and Macy 2015; Malka and Lelkes 2010; Perrin et al. 
2014). 
Case Selection: Islamism in Tunisia 
The current study uses the case of Tunisia to evaluate the depth and content of ideological 
differences between secularists and Islamists in majority-Muslim societies. The historical trajectory of 
Islamist politics in the country suggests that Tunisia is a good case to study this phenomenon. Tunisia’s 
history with Islamist politics begins with the founding of the Mouvement de la Tendance Islamique (MTI) 
– now known as the Ennahda Movement – in 1981 by its founder, spiritual leader, and current president 
Rached al-Ghannouchi. Early in its history, MTI adopted a radical ideology: members and sympathizers 
were responsible for bombings and other violence and Ghannouchi himself vocally endorsed 
implementing shari’a law (Allani 2009). As a result, MTI was subjugated and outlawed, and Ghannouchi 
himself was repeatedly arrested and eventually exiled from Tunisia in 1989. Since that time, 
Ghannouchi’s ideology has moderated, and he has come to embrace democracy, women’s rights, and 
44 
human rights (Cavatorta and Merone 2013; Kurzman 1998), though Tibi (2013) argues that Ennahda’s 
official ideology remains radical since it calls for the establishment of an Islamic state based on shari’a 
(p. 29). 
One of the reasons for the early failure of the MTI is that its ideology failed to resonate among a 
wide spectrum of the Tunisian population (Hermassi 1994). Because of the strong history of state-
sponsored assertive secularism (Kuru 2007) modeled on French laïcité, secular socialism has been the 
“dominant form of political expression” in Tunisia (Ismail 2003:141). As a result, Ennahda has historically 
seen state-sponsored secularism as one of its main grievances and has often refused to enter into a 
dialogue with leftists despite common interests (ibid. 144). Because of this history, the intensity of the 
secular-Islamist divide may be worse in North African countries that are former French colonies 
(Cavatorta 2009). Indeed, Haugbølle and Cavatorta (2011) describe the ideological divisions between 
secularists and Islamists in Tunisia as “profound” and describe Ennahda as having a “very different 
ideology” than any other party in Tunisia, rendering cross-ideological cooperation difficult (pp. 326, 
330). Ghannouchi returned to Tunisia in 2011 following the fall of Ben Ali and, while Ennahda won the 
largest share of seats in the National Constituent Assembly in the first post-Ben Ali elections, the next 
nine parties to win seats were all avowedly leftist or secular (Schwedler 2013:17), and in the following 
elections of October 2014 they were unseated by the leftist-secular Nidaa Tounes.  
Its recent history makes Tunisia an ideal case for studying political polarization. Since the fall of 
Ben Ali in January 2011, Tunisia has become the only true success story of the Arab Spring, holding free 
and fair elections and experiencing a peaceful transfer of power. Despite this success, it is likely that the 
Arab Spring may have contributed to ideological polarization. Social psychologists theorize that 
competition between groups increases the salience of competing group identities (Tajfel 1982), and that 
this is exacerbated by partisan “sorting” through elections, discussions, and exposure to partisan news 
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media (Levendusky 2009; Mason 2013, 2015). Just this sort of sorting appears to have occurred, at least 
at the party level, in Tunisia’s unsettled political field after the Arab Spring. 
Methods and Data 
The present study uses a mixed-method design to explore the contours of the secular-Islamist 
divide in Tunisia. Using data from the second wave of the Arab Barometer survey’s nationally 
representative sample of Tunisians, I first test for statistical correlates related to an Islamist political 
orientation at the individual level based on previous scholarship using survey-weighted logistic 
regression. These data describe political attitudes of 1,196 individuals and were collected in October and 
September of 2011. The Tunisian sample is unique in that respondents were asked which form of state 
they prefer (civil or religious)15 and their opinions on what constitutes both forms of governance. 
Second, I triangulate and add depth to the quantitative analyses with results from semi-
structured qualitative interviews that I performed between August 2013 and March 2014. Interview 
data were gathered on 50 respondents in five cities across the country. Most interviews were conducted 
in Tunisian Arabic, with a handful in English at the request of the respondent. I conducted the interviews 
using cognitive interviewing, which involves asking respondents to answer a set of survey items along 
with open-ended follow-up questions in order to provide insight into respondents’ perceptions of the 
survey items and the justifications for their answers (Gorman 2015). Interview questions were chosen 
among the Arab Barometer survey questions used in the quantitative analyses. Respondents were 
chosen using a combination of convenience and purposive sampling (Teddlie and Yu 2007) designed to 
oversample for self-described Islamists and Salafists. 
 
 
                                                          
15 While the survey question asks about a “religious state,” all of the respondents were Muslims and the 
definitional questions all refer to Islam. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that respondents interpreted this to 
mean an Islamic state. 
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Variables – Arab Barometer Survey 
Dependent Variables – Measuring Islamism 
The outcome variable of interest in the current study is individual-level Islamism. While is no 
single definition of Islamism in the scholarly literature of Muslim politics, scholars do tend to agree on a 
certain set of identities and beliefs that are associated with it: support for an Islamic state, support for 
implementing shari’a law, preferring Islamist political parties to secular political parties, preference for 
direct clerical involvement in politics, and feeling that piety is a desirable characteristic in politicians 
(Ayoob 2004; Bayat 2007a; Feldman 2008; Ibrahim 1980; Moaddel and Karabenick 2008; Nasr 2005; Roy 
1994; Sutton and Vertigans 2006; Tibi 2013). Because of the contention over what constitutes Islamism, 
I use two measures to operationalize Islamist ideology at the individual level. First, I construct a scale 
measuring state type preference using three questions that are unique to the Tunisian sample in the 
Arab Barometer. The first question asks whether the respondent would prefer the state be “a civil state” 
or “a religious state.” The second question asks respondents to select definitions of their preferred state 
type from three potential choices. From these questions, I constructed a continuum ranging from 
proponents of an assertive secular system (1 = most secular) to a system governed by shari’a (5 = most 
Islamist). Table 3 illustrates the construction of this measure. 
Second, I use five individual survey items in the Arab Barometer data that correspond to the 
attitudes and identities associated with Islamism mentioned in the previous paragraph. The first of these 
is the binary variable capturing whether the respondent would prefer the state be an Islamic state. The 
second captures each respondent’s party preference, with Islamist voters coded as 1.16 The final three 
variables measure support for implementing shari’a law, for clerical influence over government 
                                                          
16 Since the survey was administered in late September and early October of 2011, just before the post-Ben Ali 
Constituent Assembly elections, this question asked prospective voters for whom they would vote, were the 
election held tomorrow. The relevant Islamist parties in Tunisia mentioned by respondents in their answers to this 
question were the Ennahda Movement and the El-Fadhila Movement. 
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decisions, and for preferring pious officials in government, using the following questions, all of which 
have 4-point Likert response scales ranging from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”: 
The government and parliament should enact laws in accordance with the Islamic shari’a. 
Religious leaders (imams, preachers, priests) should have influence over government decisions. 
Tunisia would be better off if pious people held public positions. 
Table 3: Details on State Type Preference Variable Construction 
“Do you prefer that 
the state be…” 
“A _______ state is…” Islamism 
Score 
Civil 
 
… one in which the people are the source of power, the state is 
governed by the constitution and the law with citizenship being 
the highest value irrespective of religion or race, and secularism 
constitutes its cultural and civilizational frame of reference. 
 
1 
… one in which the people are the source of power and the state 
is governed by the constitution and the law with citizenship 
being the highest value irrespective of religion or race. 
 
2 
… one in which the people are the source of power, the state is 
governed by the constitution and the law with citizenship being 
the highest value irrespective of religion or race, and Islam 
constitutes its cultural and civilizational frame of reference. 
 
3 
Religious 
 
… one in which the people are the source of power, the state is 
governed by the constitution and the law with citizenship being 
the highest value irrespective of religion or race, and Islam 
constitutes its cultural and civilizational frame of reference. 
 
3 
… one in which political alternation depends on elections open to 
Islamic parties only. 
 
4 
… one in which the people are the source of power, the state is 
governed by the constitution and the law with citizenship being 
the highest value irrespective of religion or race, and Islam 
constitutes its cultural and civilizational frame of reference. 
 
5 
Note: This table shows the combination of the state type preference question and the state type definition 
questions to create an ideological variable ranging from most secularist (1, at top) to most Islamist (5, at bottom). 
The definitions labeled 3 for civil and religious states are identical. 
 
 
In what follows, I evaluate these variables as components of a coherent ideology and empirically 
test the relationship between each one and a number of independent variables identified in the relevant 
scholarly literatures.  
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Independent Variables – Demographics  
Previous literature has pointed to a number of demographic variables that may be associated 
with holding an Islamist ideology. Scholars have indicated that older people (Kurzman and Naqvi 2010), 
women (Tessler 2002; c.f., Lawrence 1995), and people living in urban environments (Ibrahim 1980; c.f., 
Kurzman and Naqvi 2010) may be more likely to hold Islamist political ideologies. I include three 
variables to incorporate these factors: 1) age in years, 2) sex, coded 1 if the respondent is female and, 3) 
binary variable coded 1 if the respondent lives in an urban area. 
A number of scholars of political Islam have also argued that Islamist attitudes thrive among 
poor, dispossessed populations (Davis 2006; Ibrahim 2002; Kepel 2003; Lust-Okar 2004; Pape 2005), 
while others argue that Islamism is an ideology of the educated middle classes (Bayat 2007b; Hermassi 
1984, 1994; Ismail 2003; Zghal 1981) or is a result of contact with the West (Lawrence 1995). To test 
these theories, I include four variables: 1) an ordinal measure of education ranging from 1 (illiterate) to 6 
(graduate-level degrees), 2) a (logged) measure of monthly household income in US dollars, 3) a binary 
variable coded 1 if the respondent is unemployed, and 4) a binary variable coded 1 if the respondent has 
visited a Western country in the past six months. 
Independent Variables – Belief and Ideology 
Involvement in religious organizations impacts individuals’ socialization and affects their 
involvement in political activities (Lipset 1960; Verba, Brady, and Schlozman 1995; Wuthnow 1999); 
thus, more religious people are more likely to hold Islamist political ideologies (Collins and Owen 2012; 
Ismail 2003; Keddie 1998). In order to test for a relationship between religious practice and Islamist 
ideology, I constructed a variable measuring overall religiosity using a series of questions that ask 
respondents to rate the frequency with which they: 1) pray daily; 2) watch or listen to religious 
programs on the radio or television; 3) attend religious lessons in mosques; 4) listen to or read the 
Qur’an; and 5) read religious books. I combined these with a question which asks respondents to 
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evaluate their own religiosity, with responses ranging from “religious” to “not religious” (Cronbach’s 
alpha = 0.7542).17 I also measure the respondent’s attitude toward takfir, or declaring other Muslims 
nonbelievers (Esposito 2002; Kepel 2002; Tibi 2013), by asking respondents to evaluate the statement 
“disagreement with some scholars in religious interpretation should not be used to label people as non-
believers” with responses ranging from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree.” 
Many scholars argue that individuals with Islamist orientations hold illiberal political attitudes; I 
test the relationship between Islamist ideology and political liberalism in three areas. First, because 
Islamists are hypothesized to be less receptive to political democracy (Gurses 2014; Lewis 1996; Meyer, 
Tope, and Price 2008), I include two attitudinal variables. The first asks respondents whether they think 
democracy undermines Tunisian culture and society, with responses ranging from “strongly disagree” to 
“strongly agree.” The second assesses support for popular sovereignty through a question that asks 
respondents if they think laws should be made according to the people’s wishes, with responses ranging 
from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree.” 
Second, scholars have pointed out that Islamists often consider issues related to gender equality 
takeoff issues, adhering to patriarchal attitudes and refusing to compromise (Alexander and Welzel 
2011; Fish 2011; Ismail 2003; Schwedler and Clark 2006). In order to test for a relationship between 
support for women’s empowerment and individual Islamism, I constructed a variable using a series of 
questions that ask respondents to rate their level of agreement with the statements: 1) a woman can 
become the prime minister or president of a Muslim state; 2) women can assume judicial positions in a 
Muslim state and; 3) women can become ministers in a Muslim state (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.8182). 
Finally, it is possible that Islamists, like other conservative religious groups around the world, 
may be relatively intolerant of followers of other religions and thus prefer to afford non-Muslims fewer 
                                                          
17 All non-binary attitudinal independent variables are z-standardized (mean=0, standard deviation=1) to facilitate 
interpretation of statistical results. 
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legal rights (Abou El Fadl 2005; Collins and Owen 2012; Kurzman and Türkoğlu 2015; Schwedler 2011; 
Yeʼor 2002). I test this relationship using two variables. The first measures whether the respondent 
believes non-Muslims should face legal discrimination in a Muslim country, with responses ranging from 
“strongly disagree” to “strongly agree.” The second captures religious tolerance, coded 1 if the 
respondent says they would have no problem with having followers of another religion as neighbors. 
Measuring the Secular-Islamist Divide – Definitional Results 
There are two empirical conditions that indicate polarization: 1) bimodality, or the absence of a 
moderate “middle” category of attitudes and; 2) ideological constraint, or consistency among policy 
attitudes and political identity. While a culture wars-style polarization hypothesis would predict a 
bimodal distribution of secularist/Islamist attitudes, the data on state type preferences tell a different 
story. Figure 7 is a histogram that illustrates the distribution of these attitudes in the data, ranked from 
“most secular” to “most Islamist”, and shows that attitudes are distributed near-normally with very few 
respondents in the extreme tails of the distribution. Figure 8 provides a more detailed breakdown of this 
data. The circles at the top indicate the percentages of respondents that chose either a civil or Islamic 
state, and the circles at the bottom indicate how respondents defined their choice of state.  
The figure shows that 47% of those who prefer an Islamic state and 64% of those who prefer a civil state 
define their ideal system in exactly the same way: “one in which the people are the source of power, the 
state is governed by the constitution and the law with citizenship being the highest value, and Islam 
constitutes its cultural and civilizational background.” What appears to be a stark divide in the first 
question evaporates as respondents define their preferred state type. Regardless of the label they 
attach to it, most secularist and Islamist respondents agree that they want a modern state that 
represents their identities as Muslims. 
 
 
51 
Figure 7: Histogram Describing Distribution of State Type Preferences 
 
Note: This figure is based on two questions unique to the Tunisian sample of the Arab Barometer second wave. 
They ask respondents 1) whether they would prefer the state be Islamic or civil, and 2) to select definitions of 
Islamic and civil states from three potential choices. The x-axis ranges from most secular (a civil state that is 
assertively secular) to most Islamist (an Islamic state that enforces shari’a law) and the y-axis is the percentage of 
respondents that fall in a given category. The figure shows that most respondents fall in the middle of the 
spectrum, with relatively few on the extreme ends. 
 
 
Descriptive analyses of the data indicate a fair amount of constraint among Islamists, though 
not enough to empirically show that the other five dependent variables are indicators of some larger 
latent construct. Figure 9 shows the number of respondents who gave Islamist responses to the entire 
range these survey questions (ordinal variables are dichotomized into “disagree” and “agree” 
categories) and shows that, as the number of Islamist responses increases, the number of respondents 
decreases; relatively few respondents gave Islamist responses to four or five questions (8% and 4%, 
respectively).  
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Figure 8: Choice of Islamic or Civil State and Definition of Respondent Choice 
 
Note: This figure is based on two questions unique to the Tunisian sample of the Arab Barometer second wave. 
They ask respondents 1) whether they would prefer the state be Islamic or civil, and 2) to select definitions of 
Islamic and civil states from three potential choices. The circles on top represent state type preference and the 
bubbles on the bottom represent the respondent’s definition of that choice. The arrows represent the percentage 
of respondents in each category that chose a given definition. The figure shows that most respondents, whether 
they chose an Islamic or civil state, prefer a state in which “the people are the source of power, the state is 
governed by the constitution and the law with citizenship being the highest value, and Islam constitutes its cultural 
and civilizational background.” 
 
 
Likewise, as the correlation matrix in Table 4 shows, the bivariate correlations between these variables 
range from 0.12 to 0.59. 
In addition, the Cronbach’s alpha score for the five dependent variables is 0.66, which is short of 
the acceptable range for indices. Taken together, these results indicate that there may be less 
polarization between secularists and Islamists than previous literature would suggest.  
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Figure 9: Bar Chart Showing Number of Respondents Giving “Islamist” Responses to Survey Items 
 
Note: This figure shows the percentage of respondents who gave “Islamist” responses to zero to five of the 
dependent variables measuring Islamism – a score of zero indicates that the respondent gave no Islamist 
responses, while a score of five indicates that the respondent gave Islamist responses to all five dependent 
variables. The figure shows that very few respondents were consistently Islamist in their expressed attitudes. All 
ordinal dependent variables (support shari’a, clerical influence over government, and prefer pious government 
officials) are dichotomized into “disagree” and “agree” responses for this figure. The state type dependent variable 
is excluded because it is constructed from the Islamic state variable. 
 
 
 
Table 4: Correlation Matrix for Variables Measuring Islamist Attitudes 
 Islamic 
State 
Islamist 
Voter 
Support 
Shari’a 
Clerical 
Influence 
Pious 
Officials 
Islamic State -     
Islamist Voter 0.20 -    
Support Shari’a 0.29 0.19 -   
Clerical Influence 0.21 0.12 0.23 -  
Pious Officials 0.36 0.22 0.31 0.59 - 
 
Note: All correlations are statistically significant at p<0.001. The state type dependent variable is excluded because 
it is constructed from the Islamic state variable; its correlations are very similar to those for the Islamic state 
variable. 
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Evaluating the Secular-Islamist Divide – Attitudinal Results 
Models 
In order to test for relationships between Islamism and theoretically-important independent 
variables, I estimate a series of regression models with sampling weights applied to ensure a nationally-
representative sample. For binary dependent variables (Islamic state and Islamist voter), the logistic 
regression model is: 
Pr(𝑌) =
1
1 + 𝑒−(𝑈+𝑋𝛽+𝜀𝑖)
 
Where Pr(Y) is the probability of an individual scoring 1 on the dependent variable, X is a matrix of 
covariates, β is a vector of coefficients, U is a constant intercept term, and εi is an individual-specific 
error term. I use robust standard errors in all models. For ordinal dependent variables (preferred state 
type, support shari’a, clerical influence over government, and prefer pious government officials), the 
ordered logistic regression model is: 
𝐿𝑜𝑔 (
Pr (𝑌 ≤ 𝑚|𝑋)
Pr (𝑌 > 𝑚|𝑋)
) =  𝜏𝑚 −  𝑋𝛽 +  𝑈 
Where Pr(Y) is the probability of an individual’s score on the dependent variable being m ordered 
category of the dependent variable, 𝑋 is a matrix of covariates, β is a vector of coefficients, τ is a cut 
point, and 𝑈 is a constant term. 
Missing Data 
Missing data were imputed using the iterative chained equations approach, creating five 
imputations for each dependent variable for a total of six imputed datasets. All variables were 
transformed before imputing (Von Hippel 2009). To avoid perfect prediction problems when imputing 
categorical variables, I implemented an augmented-regression approach which adds a few observations 
with small weights to the data during estimation to avoid perfect prediction (White, Daniel, and Royston 
2010).  
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Model Results – Demographics 
Table 5 presents the results of the regression models using the Arab Barometer data. Results 
show that women and young people may be less likely to express Islamist orientations than men and 
older people. Neither urban dwelling nor unemployment has a statistically significant effect in any 
multivariate model. Education and income are negatively and significantly associated with Islamist 
ideology in full models for five of six dependent variables, indicating that Islamism is appealing to 
individuals with a relatively low socioeconomic status. Having visited a Western country in the past six 
months is positively and significantly related to support for implementing shari’a law only (Model 8). 
1Model Results – Belief and Ideology 
The variable measuring religious belief and practice is a positive and significant predictor of 
holding an Islamist orientation across all models, as predicted by previous theories. The takfir variable, 
on the other hand, is not a statistically significant predictor of the dependent variable in any multivariate 
model. While the variable capturing the feeling that democracy undermines Tunisian cultural values is a 
significant and positive predictor of Islamism in half of the multivariate models (Models 4, 10, and 12), 
support for popular sovereignty is significantly and positively associated with support for shari’a (Model 
8) but statistically unrelated to the other dependent variables. The women’s empowerment variable 
does not have a statistically significant relationship with Islamism in any multivariate model. 
Endorsement of limited rights for non-Muslims has an inconsistent relationship with the dependent 
variables: it is negatively associated with support for shari’a (Model 8) but positively associated with 
preference for clerical influence over government and pious government officials (Models 11 and 12). 
Finally, religious tolerance is negatively associated with the dependent variable in three of six 
multivariate models (Models 4, 8, and 10). 
Results of these models demonstrate that people who hold Islamist political orientations are 
more likely to engage in religious practice and see themselves as religious than secularists, but provide 
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less evidence that the two differ in other substantive areas. For example, secularists appear to be just as 
likely as Islamists to consider takfir appropriate. Likewise, there is little evidence that Islamists are more 
likely to be illiberal than secularists. While Islamists appear to have more reservations about the 
application of democracy in Tunisia, this seems to have no bearing on attitudes toward popular 
sovereignty. The two groups do not empirically differ on attitudes toward women’s empowerment, an 
issue-area about which they are theorized to sharply disagree. Finally, the differences between the 
groups in terms of treatment of non-Muslims show a fair amount of disagreement but also attitudinal 
overlap. Support for legal discrimination against non-Muslims is positively associated with two 
dependent variables (prefer clerical influence over government and prefer pious government officials) 
but is negatively associated with support for implementing shari’a; tolerance for non-Muslim neighbors 
is associated positively associated with three of six dependent variables. 
Explaining the Secular-Islamist Divide – Discursive Results 
Let us now turn to the results of the cognitive interviews that I conducted in Tunisia between 
August 2013 and March 2014. Because responses from these interviews are drawn from questions in the 
Arab Barometer survey, they provide depth and clarification to the statistical analyses. The names of 
individual respondents have been changed to protect their identities. 
Liberal and Secular Elements in Islamist Discourses 
Results of quantitative analyses indicate that there are relatively few areas of difference in 
political ideology between Islamists and secularists; interview results highlight some of these 
differences. Many Islamists took issue with concepts like democracy and offered Islamic alternatives to 
secular practices. One key point of contention was around elections, which some respondents argued 
should be replaced with Islamic concepts like shura (consultation). Many respondents who endorsed 
shura described it as a quasi-democratic system with limited franchise: 
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Salim: Shura is a kind of election, but not everyone is allowed to vote... the elder people 
in the society who are known to be intelligent, wise, and intellectually mature, they are 
the ones who will vote. (28, electrician, Bizerte) 
Noureddine: In Islam we should listen to everybody when making a decision. The 
difference between shura and democracy is that with shura the experts are the ones who 
make the final decisions after listening to all of the consultations. (27, engineer, Bizerte) 
While these examples indicate that many Islamist-oriented individuals do indeed hold illiberal political 
attitudes, my interviews with self-described secularists show that a preference for expert rule is 
common among the latter group as well, and for many of the same reasons, as Rym’s response 
illustrates: 
Expert rule is a very good system, you can see it now. The parliament is doing stupid things, 
wasting time, and fighting. There is still no constitution. They should be cooperating, but they 
aren’t. Tunisians need good governance, not infighting. It would be better if Tunisia was 
governed by a technocratic elite. (28, college student, Tunis) 
The shura examples provide evidence that there are substantive differences between secularists 
and Islamists, but the results of my interviews suggest that even some individuals who expressed a 
desire for a revolutionary break with the current political system in Tunisia defined their ideal state in 
terms that would be familiar to a global, secular audience. Abdelaziz, a self-described Salafist with 
kinship ties to the Islamist group Ansar al-Shari’a, for example, defined the ideal Islamic state in part as a 
European-style welfare state: 
I want my political system to allow me to think, live, participate, and be active in my society. 
That’s why I prefer an Islamic system in its true conception… the Islam that Omar Ibn Abi Khattab 
told us to follow. He was a genius, he took the zakat and used them to translate religious 
materials, he made a social security system long before its birth in Europe. This is the Islam that I 
love, and I would like to see Islam not only in the mosques but also in the government, as Sayyid 
Qutb envisioned. (32, high school administrator, Kairouan) 
Abdelaziz went on to say that “this is not the religion you can find in… Saudi Arabia, where the monarchs 
live in riches” while exploiting laborers and “telling people what they should and should not do.” 
Similarly, Fadi, an adamant Islamist and 61-year-old small business owner from Kairouan, used the 
example of Omar Ibn Abi Khattab to describe the ideal Islamic political system, which encourages “the 
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spread of freedom, justice, equality,” and the “rights of workers” who he repeatedly described as 
systematically abused and marginalized. Others echoed the anti-discriminatory language in global 
discourses as they justified their support for Islamist positions like implementing shari’a. A few examples 
include: 
Hamza: The first pillar of shari’a is respect of religion, all religions. If you have an Islamic 
government where the ruler applies Islam, he must also respect the concept of the modern state. 
He should preserve the Christian religion, the Jewish religion, and protect all of the people. He 
should provide everyone with… social justice. (24, college student, Tunis) 
Salim: We have the shari’a in our religion, and in it you can find all of the components of a 
thriving socio-economic and cultural system that protects all people regardless of their color, 
ethnicity, or religion. (28, electrician, Bizerte) 
Habib, who agreed with the survey question about implementing shari’a, said: 
The problem is not with shari’a, but with how it is being discussed and applied. If we all sit 
around a table and talk about the philosophy of Islam, we would have to talk about justice, 
freedom, development, and strengthening the capacities of the state and society. (33, graphic 
designer, Kairouan) 
During his interview, Habib referred to the Netherlands as a model for democracy and the United 
Kingdom as a place where religious freedom and freedom of expression strike an appropriate balance. 
Finally, I found little evidence that secularists and Islamists diverge on economic issues. Perhaps 
the clearest example of this in the Tunisian context is tourism. Nearly every self-described Islamist I 
interviewed was very keen to emphasize to me how tourism would remain an integral part of the 
Tunisian economy, although many went to great lengths to describe what “Islamic” tourism would look 
like. Elyes, for example, offered an Islamic alternative to the sort of drinking-on-the-beach tourism that 
is popular among Westerners traveling to Tunisia, proposing: 
Islamic tourism is tourism that focuses on places of special importance to Islamic history, like 
Zeitouna or the Great Mosque in Kairouan. This will help promote a good image of Islam around 
the world. Also, in Islamic tourism religious experts provide oversight to make sure that an 
accurate and positive image of Islam is being projected, and that the tourists and tourism sector 
employees adhere to Islamic principles. (28, mechanic, Bizerte) 
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One of the largest areas of disagreement between secularists and Islamists has to do with the 
prohibition of alcohol. When it comes to tourists and other foreigners, however, even Eskander, who 
introduced himself to me as a “jihadist and terrorist,” took a hands-off approach: 
If investors or tourists want to come to Tunisia, as long as they don’t come to fight our religion, 
they are welcome. If they are Christians or Jews they can drink in private, but if they drink 
outside they should be punished because this propagates bad behavior and is not good in front 
of other people. (21, home security system installer, Kairouan) 
Thus, even the most rigidly Islamist-minded individuals share a desire for a thriving, tourism-based 
economy with their secular counterparts and are willing to compromise on controversial and potentially 
polarizing issues – such as alcohol consumption – in order to safeguard the economic success of the 
country as a whole. 
Illiberal and Islamist Elements in Secularist Discourses 
Just as many Islamists I spoke with were eager to offer illiberal policies and practices like shura 
that deviated from the secular status quo, many of the self-declared secularists I interviewed offered 
critiques of these policies and practices. Among the most popular targets of critique was Islamists’ focus 
on implementing shari’a, which many secularists described as backwards: 
Jihan: Because of all of our human progress – people, ideas, technology – Islamic shari’a cannot 
be the system used to rule and govern Tunisia... Let me give you an example. In the Islamic 
shari’a stealing is prohibited, and thieves should have their hands cut off, but this is unacceptable 
today from a legal and human rights perspective… We live in a new era, a new time. (40, small 
business owner, Kairouan) 
Jalel: It would be impossible to let an Islamist group govern in the name of God… For example, 
women are a vital part of our society, they can’t be excluded. But literalists would say that 
women shouldn’t go outside their home. Nobody will accept this today. It would be a new form 
of dictatorship! (25, office administrator, Sfax) 
Likewise, many secularists and leftists expressed a distaste for Islamists in general. Leila, a self-described 
communist, was fearful that the Islamist-led Tunisian government would force women to wear niqab: 
… if they’re convinced that [wearing niqab] is good, I don’t care if they wear it. On the other 
hand, I should have the right to invite people not to wear it. That’s the problem in Tunisia. They 
have the right to invite people to wear niqab and everything, but other people don’t have the 
right to invite people not to do it! You’ll be condemned to death! (21, college student, Tunis) 
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This distaste for Islamists went beyond fears of backwards and draconian policies. Leila, for example, 
went on to describe women wearing niqab as “disrespectful” of other people and described bearded 
men as “dirty and disgusting.” Similarly, while speaking with a group of secularists at a café in Tunis in 
late August, I witnessed a conversation during which everyone shared their favorite niqab- and beard-
related urban legends, mocking people who wear these as uneducated and dangerous. 
The results of my interviews also show that Tunisian secularists are not consistently liberal in 
their political attitudes. Fatima, a female entrepreneur, said of women’s empowerment: 
I am with the emancipation and freedom of women. I’m with equality and participation of both 
men and women in society. But nobody should give up their natural roles in society to go out and 
do whatever they want. (46, hotel owner, Sfax) 
This “special roles” discourse is common among Islamist organizations and anathema to most secular 
organizations and global discourses on women’s empowerment. More striking was the consensus 
among a wide range of secularists that, as Darine, a 24-year-old college student from Tunis put it, 
“people should enjoy only a limited number of freedoms.” Hedi, a vocal secularist, told me that a strong 
leader who does not have to bother with parliament or elections would be very good for Tunisia 
because: 
People are ignorant and they don’t know how to use democracy. At some point, we just need 
sustainability. Just one person doing his best… for sure he will be a bit selfish, but at least he will 
ensure stability. It’s impossible to implement a fully democratic system... we don’t need a lot of 
captains for the same boat. (30, professional consultant, Tunis) 
Later in the interview, Hedi went on to offer words of praise for the decisive actions of leaders like Hitler 
and Stalin – and he was far from alone. At a café in Bizerte in August, a young man very loudly expressed 
his opinion that “Tunisia needs a dictator who is a cross between Hitler and Stalin” because Tunisians 
are “too uneducated to govern themselves.” It is unlikely that any of these secularist discourses would 
find much support among global audiences. 
Finally, the interview results show that many secularists incorporate explicitly Islamist ideas into 
their political ideologies; this was most apparent in secularist justifications for opposing implementation 
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of shari’a. Many respondents said that, despite their survey questionnaire answers to the contrary, they 
would support implementing shari’a so long as it was defined according to their own interpretation. As 
Fatima, who strongly disagreed with the survey question about implementing shari’a, lamented: 
The rules of Islam regulate and legislate all parts of life – trade, ethics, how you deal with your 
children. Shari’a is something clear, something that I am truly convinced of. The problem with 
shari’a is that everyone explains it according to their own ideas. (47, hotel administrator, Sfax) 
Similarly, Mohamed strongly disagreed with the survey question about implementing shari’a but 
nonetheless had positive words to say about it: 
I don’t think that shari’a is something inflexible. I think that it is an open door for people to grow 
intellectually and to participate in decision-making because it gives priority to the people, not to 
religious scholars. This is shari’a from my personal point of view. (34, manager, Kairouan) 
Taher, who also strongly disagreed with the survey question about implementing shari’a, answered 
similarly: 
Talking about shari’a can be constraining, because you’re trying to impose your personal 
definition of shari’a that I don’t agree with. If we actually talk about what shari’a is, we find out 
it is just a bunch of rules… if those rules are about human rights, no cheating, no stealing, 
transparency, open government, if you say that is shari’a, then of course I want shari’a. (27, 
consultant, Tunis) 
These examples show that shari’a – often described as one of the key pillars of Islamist ideology – is a 
deeply contested symbol of Muslim identity that even avowed secularists are unwilling to turn against. 
Instead, many secularists appropriate elements of Islamist discourses in ways that would be 
recognizable to both Islamists and a liberal global audience. 
Building on the quantitative analyses, results of the interview analyses provide additional 
evidence of substantive overlaps between secularists and Islamists. There are some major differences 
between the groups in a handful of specific policy areas and a good deal of out-group animosity. 
However, the presented evidence suggests that: 1) Islamist are not uniformly illiberal, 2) secularists are 
not uniformly liberal, and 3) members of both groups often adopt elements of the opposing group’s 
ideology and discourse. Thus, while secularists and Islamists tend to employ a different set of symbolic 
63 
imagery and ideological justifications, many appear united as Tunisians around a whole host of issues 
related to governance, rights, economic development, and social justice.  
Discussion and Conclusion 
Drawing on careful analyses of a wide and diverse range of empirical evidence, previous 
scholarship has argued that Islamists are “ideological actors” so committed to their ideological principles 
that cooperation with other groups is difficult if not impossible (Clark 2006; Schwedler 2006; Schwedler 
and Clark 2006). Most of the research in this area, however, has focused on political parties and 
organizations rather than their potential constituents or supporters. Political scientists have shown that 
elites and parties tend to be more ideologically-driven than the masses (Fiorina and Abrams 2008; 
Fiorina et al. 2011), particularly if they position themselves as carriers of religious morality (Jenkins 
2007; Smilde 2007). Thus, while there is substantial evidence documenting the ideological struggles 
between secularist and Islamist parties and organizations in the Muslim world, it is unclear if attitudes at 
the individual level follow the same pattern of polarization. 
The current study proposes that individual support for Islamist political positions – such as the 
creation of an Islamic state and implementing shari’a law – is not necessarily associated with illiberal 
attitudes. Drawing on theories that conceptualize political ideologies as boundary markers that separate 
social identity groups, I argue that most secularists and Islamists agree on most substantive political 
issues. Descriptive quantitative results suggest that most Tunisians – both self-described secularists and 
self-described Islamists – desire a political system that has high levels of transparency, citizen 
participation, and accountability, with Islam as its cultural and civilizational frame of reference. Similarly, 
the results of the regression analyses find no statistical difference between Islamists and secularists on 
attitudes relating to the appropriateness of takfir, popular sovereignty, or women’s empowerment, and 
little difference on support for legal discrimination against non-Muslims. While there is some evidence 
that Islamists more likely to have reservations about democracy per se and less likely to be tolerant of 
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followers of other religions, these relationships are statistically associated with only half of the measures 
of Islamism employed in this study. Qualitative analyses of interview data indicate that there is more 
substantive overlap between secularists and Islamists than the quantitative results suggest: even 
Salafists and self-described radicals tend to agree with secular-minded Tunisians on the importance of 
social justice and minority rights, and vocal secularists are often willing to entertain implementing 
shari’a law in the abstract. 
The current study’s most apparent limitation is that the results are based on data only from 
Tunisia. Because of Tunisia’s unique historical trajectory – a long tradition of state-led assertive 
secularization, an institutionalized moderate religious field, a charismatic leader of the Islamist 
movement in Rached al-Ghannouchi, and recent political openings in the aftermath of the Arab Spring – 
it is unclear to what extent findings from Tunisia generalize to the rest of the Muslim world. For 
example, Ghannouchi, who was keen to cooperate with leftists after the Arab Spring and afforded them 
many concessions in the country’s first post-uprising elections (Schwedler 2013), may play the role of a 
moderator between the two ideological blocs. However, some scholars have criticized Ghannouchi for 
being inconsistently liberal and for continuing to call for the establishment of an Islamic state (Filali-
Ansary 1996; Tibi 2013). 
Likewise, Tunisia’s history of secular politics may have ensured that individual Tunisian Islamists 
are more moderate than Islamists in other countries and regions and, because of this Tunisian 
exceptionalism, there may be more polarization elsewhere in the Muslim world. Yet, it is possible that 
the post-independence Tunisian state, with its policy of assertive secularism, may have a higher degree 
of polarization than other majority-Muslim contexts (Cavatorta 2009; Cavatorta and Merone 2013; 
Haugbølle and Cavatorta 2011). Future research, drawing on new data at the individual level, should 
extend this line of inquiry to other contexts, investigating how the contours of the secular-Islamist divide 
differ from country to country and over time. 
65 
Social scientists already know that ideological polarization operates differently on the elite and 
mass levels, with the latter exhibiting less evidence of ideological constraint and bimodal distributions of 
political attitudes. However, the relative lack of studies of individual-level political attitudes among 
partisans in the Muslim world has obscured widespread agreement on many social and political issues. 
The results of the current study indicate that, like Americans, Tunisians general agreement on these 
issues is overshadowed by the experience of deep polarization exacerbated by political entrepreneurs. 
By bringing the constituents back in, this study is one step towards offering a more complete picture of 
the relationships between political Islam, secularism, and liberal political attitudes.
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CHAPTER 4: ISLAMISM AND DEMOCRACY IN THE ARAB ONLINE PUBLIC SPHERE 
Introduction 
In the previous two chapters, I have investigated Islamism, or the idea that politics and social 
relations should be organized around some set of explicitly Islamic principles. Using a combination of 
statistical analyses of survey data and content analyses of cognitive interviews I performed in Tunisia, I 
explored the correlates and causes of Islamist identities and ideologies, focusing specifically on the 
relationship between Islamism and global norms such as democracy, women’s rights, human rights, 
environmentalism, and so on. In these previous chapters, I found that the ideological divide between 
Islamists and non-Islamists is less stark than the existing scholarly literature would expect, that people 
who have Islamist political preferences (e.g., supporting shari’a law) do not necessarily object to the 
content of global norms, and that adopting Islamist identities and ideologies is a form of boundary work 
that many Muslims use to take a stance on the perceived historical mistreatment of Muslims by 
powerful global actors. 
The current chapter builds on the previous studies by investigating how Muslims discuss 
Islamism and a particularly salient global norm, democracy, online. I employ a combination of 
dictionary-based and unsupervised (Latent Dirichlet allocation, or LDA) text classification techniques to 
analyze over 200,000 posts on the popular Arabic-language messageboard majalisna.com. I then use 
fixed-effects logistic regression models to evaluate the relationships between the broad topics identified 
by the LDA models and the sub-topics of Islamism and democracy at the document level (messageboard 
post) as well as the individual level (messageboard poster). Results indicate two primary sets of findings. 
First, there is relatively little evidence of a substantive divide between Islamists and non-Islamists on the 
forums: discussion of Islamism-related concepts (like shari’a law) are relatively evenly distributed 
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throughout the broad forum topics, and people who discuss these concepts are no more likely to engage 
in political discussions than those who do not. Second, democracy is a contentious topic because of its 
relationship to the West and other powerful global actors: democracy-related posts tend to be clustered 
in political topics, and people who discuss democracy are more likely to post about international crises, 
conflicts, and conspiracy theories than those who do not. 
Data and the Online Public Sphere 
As data scientists often remind us, we live in a world of exponentially increasing data production 
thanks to the spread of computer technology and online communication. Unfortunately, social scientists 
have been slow to adapt to these changes in data structure and availability (Bail 2014b; Farrell and 
Petersen 2010; Lazer et al. 2009). There are some notable exceptions to this trend, however. For 
example, King and Lowe (2003) use automated techniques to build a dataset of events by having 
computers “read’ news sources, Hopkins and King (2010) and Montgomery et al. (2012) classify text 
media using supervised classification techniques, Bail (2012, 2014a) uses plagiarism detection software 
to show how discursive fields settle after major historical ruptures, Gaby and Caren (2012) illustrate how 
the Occupy movement recruited people using user-generated content and user-driven sharing of 
pictures, and Golder and Macy (2011) use tweets to track cycles of affect variation over time. This work, 
while cutting-edge, is still dominated by analyses of English-language text despite increasing internet 
penetration and the growing size of the non-English online sphere. This chapter will join these previous 
studies in using millions of instances of text data to trace the contours of discursive fields using internet 
data; it will build on them by, among other things, analyzing Arabic-language text. 
Text production is perhaps the most pervasive and persistent form of political behavior (Monroe 
and Schrodt 2008). The advent of the internet and digital communication has increasingly granted 
individuals the opportunity to comment in public spaces on topics of general interest to a broad 
audience, leading to the creating of what some call “online public spheres” (Poor 2005) that are difficult 
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for existing elites to control (Tufekci and Wilson 2012) and reduce the importance of geographical 
boundaries, facilitating networking among dispersed individuals (Caren, Jowers, and Gaby 2012). The 
idea that internet discussions comprise a public sphere has been supported empirically; research has 
shown that internet use increases political knowledge and participation among users (Wagner and 
Gainous 2013), and that people discuss political issues in a variety of online settings, including forums 
for reality television shows (Graham 2012). 
The Arab Online Public Sphere 
A handful of area studies scholars have investigated the expansion of a transnational Arab public 
sphere, beginning with the advent of Al-Jazeera and other Arabic-language satellite television networks 
(Eickelman and Salvatore 2004) and, more recently, internet posts on news websites (Douai and Nofal 
2012; Lynch 2006) and social media sites like Facebook (Hanna 2013). According to this scholarship, 
these increasingly-available media create an Arab public sphere by addressing an “imagined community” 
(Anderson 2006) that is Arabic-speaking and concerned with transnational Arab-Islamic issues 
(Eickelman and Salvatore 2004; Lynch 2006), although some have reported evidence for national 
clustering of topics, especially in the blogosphere (Etling et al. 2010). Regardless, it seems as though 
Arabs consider the emerging internet-facilitated pattern of communication a public sphere and, thus, 
scholars can consider it as such. 
The little research that has been done on the AOPS has drawn strikingly similar conclusions. 
Douai and Nofal (2012) find that the discourses in the AOPS are diverse and open and are not always 
biased in favor of Arabs and/or Muslims, and Lynch (2007) finds that supporters of Islamist and 
secularist ideologies are able to find common ground on the blogosphere. Lynch’s (2006) examination of 
the topics of Al-Jazeera programs, while not drawn from internet texts, is instructive in illustrating the 
most likely topics of discussion in the AOPS. These include western imperialism, elections in the west 
and how their results might affect Arabs, political hotspots in the Arab/Muslim world like Palestine 
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(Etling et al. 2010), and elections in the Arab/Muslim world. Previous research suggests that concepts 
related to democracy and religion should abound on Arabic-language message boards. Discussions of 
the latter may be particularly prevalent, given the underrepresentation of Islamist arguments on 
satellite television channels (Lynch 2006) and the tendency for these actors to turn to alternative outlets 
to express their views and build their networks (for some examples, see Hirschkind 2001, 2006). 
Data 
The data for this project were gathered from the internet messageboard majalisna.com, an 
Arabic-language general issue messageboard based in the Sultanate of Oman. The complete dataset 
consists of a 214,861 posts made by 5,500 unique individual posters between 14 October 2000 and 18 
March 2013. Majalisna is administered entirely in Arabic and posters reside in at least 53 countries 
around the world including the Arab world, the West, China, Russia, and South America.18 Majalisna is a 
relatively popular forum, with an average of 81 posts by 16 unique posters per day over the specified 
time period. Like other online discussion sites, however, the content tends to be dominated by a small 
number of highly prolific individual posters (Hagemann 2002; Hanna 2013; Hindman 2009). Table 7 lists 
the top ten countries by number of individual posters, Figure 10 is a time series illustrating monthly 
patterns of activity on the forum, and Figure 11 shows the post count distribution for individual posters. 
Much of the research on the AOPS has focused on text generated on social media sites (e.g., 
Hanna 2013; Tufekci and Wilson 2012) or online news media like Al-Jazeera (e.g., Douai and Nofal 2012; 
Lynch 2006). To my knowledge, there are no studies analyzing Arabic-language posts on internet 
messageboards. While this reliance on social media and media outlets for text data is understandable 
due to the relative ease of accessing these data, I argue that data drawn from messageboards offers a 
number of distinct advantages. First, messageboards predate social media outlets like Facebook and 
                                                          
18 Providing location is voluntary on Majalisna, and only 2,296 (approximately 42 percent) of posters report their 
national location. The actual number of countries, therefore, could be higher than 53. 
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Twitter by a significant margin; messageboard data is thus useful for studying text about longer-term 
historical topics (e.g., the September 11th attacks, the beginning of the 2003 Iraq war, etc.). Second, 
because messageboard posts are long-form, the volume of data they produce per document is relatively 
large, making them more suitable for certain text analysis techniques (like LDA). Third, messageboards 
are forums for discussion among complete strangers, which may result in interaction among a more 
diverse set of opinions than a Facebook page that restricts access to members only. Finally, because 
messageboards are more anonymous than other social media sites, posters may be more likely to 
express controversial or dangerous opinions. For these reasons, I argue that internet messageboards are  
Table 6: Internet Use Statistics in the Arab World 
Country Internet 
Users 
Facebook 
Users 
Messageboard 
Users 
Algeria 46% 72% 37% 
Egypt 30% 82% 40% 
Iraq 26% 82% 49% 
Jordan 48% 57% 17% 
Kuwait 82% 72% 54% 
Lebanon 64% 83% 30% 
Libya 50% 62% 16% 
Morocco 50% 78% 33% 
Palestine 53% 71% 35% 
Sudan 47% 76% 41% 
Tunisia 31% 69% 21% 
Yemen 37% 80% 42% 
Note: Figures drawn from the third wave of the Arab Barometer survey, which covers 2012-2015. The percentage 
of internet users is the percentage of individuals who gave any response to the question “How often do you use 
the internet?” other than “I do not use the internet.” Facebook and messageboard users are presented as 
percentage of internet users in each country. 
 
 
Table 7: Ten Countries with the Highest Number of Majalisna Members 
Rank Country Members 
1 Egypt 4,352 
2 Oman 3,886 
3 Palestine 3,032 
4 Saudi Arabia 2,652 
5 Jordan 1,646 
6 Syria 1,575 
7 Yemen 1,507 
8 Sweden 1,021 
9 Morocco 1,015 
10 Germany 902 
Note: Majalisna members with unknown locations are dropped from the sample in this table. 
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a useful source of data on top of the more popular platforms like Twitter and Facebook. Table 6 
describes internet use in the Arab world among the twelve countries included in the third wave of the 
Arab Barometer survey. It shows that, while messageboard use is rarer than Facebook membership, a 
large number of Arab internet users in each country also post on messageboards (between 17% and 
54%).  
Text Classification Methods 
The two most common techniques for computer-assisted text analysis – unsupervised topic 
modeling and dictionary-based analyses – each have strengths and weaknesses. Following Guo and 
colleagues’ (2016) advice, the current study uses both in an attempt to overcome the weaknesses and 
emphasize the strengths of each technique. 
Unsupervised Topic Modeling: Latent Dirichlet Allocation 
In much the same way that exploratory factor analyses use item covariances to uncover latent 
constructs in a dataset, unsupervised machine learning algorithms, such as topic modeling attempt to 
learn the “hidden structure” in a dataset. In essence, the algorithm attempts to discover the multiple 
latent “topics” within the data given the frequency with which words appear within a given text, and 
every document is assumed to have some proportion of each topic but to varying extents. The algorithm 
then assigns each text a weighted mixture of topics based on these word frequencies. While there are a 
wide variety of topic modeling algorithms, Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) is the most commonly used 
(Blei, Ng, and Jordan 2003; Hoffman, Bach, and Blei 2010). 
Unsupervised topic modeling algorithms like LDA have a number of important strengths. First, 
because they require little input from researchers, they dramatically reduce the resources required to 
analyze large text corpuses. Second, because computers are automated systems, they may discover 
topics that human researchers may otherwise miss (Quinn et al. 2010; Riffe, Fico, and Lacy 2014). Third, 
topic models like LDA are “mixed-membership models,” meaning that each document is assumed 
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to contain some mixture of topics rather than being limited to exhibiting a single topic (Blei and Lafferty 
2009; Blei et al. 2003). In a first-of-its-kind study, Guo and colleagues (2016) find that LDA models 
perform better than more labor-intensive approaches in outlining the topics present in extremely large 
text corpuses. 
These models also have substantial weaknesses, most of which derive from the fact that they 
are (usually) entirely inductive.19 First, the lack of input on the part of the researcher makes assessing 
reliability and validity difficult (Hillard, Purpura, and Wilkerson 2008), and leading scholars suggest that 
unsupervised topic modeling always be paired with supplementary analyses, as they are prone to 
producing both false positives and nonsensical topics (Zamith and Lewis 2015). Second, while topic 
models are good at identifying very broad and common topics, they often fail to identify rare or very 
specific subtopics (Guo et al. 2016; Hillard et al. 2008). Finally, while topic models have been 
demonstrated to be effective when analyzing routinized and edited media like newspapers and scholarly 
journal articles, they work less well with natural language text generated on social media, which tends 
to be irregular and less formulaic (Tang, Zhang, and Mei 2013). Thus, text data gathered on social media 
need to be thoroughly normalized before analyzing them with topic models. 
The current study uses LDA to identify the broad contours of the Majalisna data. To prepare the 
data for analysis, I first performed character normalization: eliminating tashkeel and tatweel, converting 
alef-hamza constructions to simple alef, converting non-alef hamza constructions to unseated hamza, 
changing alef maksura to yeh and taa marbuta to heh, and reducing the number of characters that 
repeat three or more times to one. I then stemmed the entire corpus, reducing each word to a base 
form (Manning, Raghavan, and Schütze 2008). Because Arabic is a root-based language, there are a 
number of strategies for stemming – I chose to use Tashaphyne (Zerrouki 2010), a so-called “light” 
19 While there have been some advances in hybrid “supervised topic models,” these remain underused, especially 
in the social sciences (McAuliffe and Blei 2008). The technical aspects of these hybrid methods are too detailed to 
discuss here. 
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stemmer, because it uses common verb forms, grammatical constructions, and pluralization patterns to 
produce a minimum representation of each word without stripping it down to its root (El-Defrawy, El-
Sonbaty, and Belal 2015).20 I also removed all punctuation, numbers, extra spaces, special characters, 
and stop words. Then I used the CountVectorizer module from the scikit-learn machine learning toolkit 
to generate a term-frequency list that included any remaining word that occurred in less than 95% of 
the documents but more than 50. Finally, I ran a 10-topic LDA model on the resulting data and 
generated a document-classification score for each topic in each document. 
The model found ten substantive topics that fall into four broad categories. They are: self-help, 
storytelling, and addressing the forums (conversational); romance and marriage (relationships); Qur’anic 
studies, religious storytelling, and religious idioms (religion); and history and the Arab world in crisis 
(politics). Table 8 lists these topics and the top ten words most associated with them in English (see 
Appendix 2A for a more thorough examination of the Arabic features associated with each topic). The 
time series in Figure 12 shows how these topics have been invoked on Majalisna over time and indicates 
that most topics, with the exception of the political topics, are invoked at a relatively stable rate. 
Dictionary-Based Classification: Islamism and Democracy 
One of the major weaknesses of the topic modeling approach to text classification is that is 
misses relatively rare sub-topics that are generally of interest to researchers. Employing a dictionary-
based method – i.e., using and refining a set of search terms to identify documents exhibiting a 
particular sub-topic – allows for a more focused analysis (Eshbaugh-Soha 2010; Grimmer and Stewart 
2013). Used in unison, the two methods are helpful in identifying how specific sub-topics are related to 
broader, more general topics (Guo et al. 2016). For the current study, I used a dictionary list to identify 
two sub-topics: Islamism and democracy. The English-equivalent dictionary list for each sub-topic is 
                                                          
20 For example, the three-letter root for the word “نودعاسي” or “they are helping” is “دعس” which translates to “to be 
happy/fortunate.” The Tashaphyne light stemmer identifies the stem of “نودعاسي” as “دعاس” or “to help.” 
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presented in Table 9 (see Appendix 2B for more detailed information on the dictionary lists in Arabic). I 
used a regular expression parser in Python to identify posts that contained at least one item on the 
dictionary lists using normalized, but un-stemmed, text. The program identified 2,711 posts with 
Islamism-related words (1.26% of all posts) and 5,213 posts with democracy-related words (2.43% of all 
posts). The time series in Figure 13 illustrates the relative invocation of these sub-themes over time. The 
figure shows that the distribution of the Islamism- and democracy-related subtopics is more volatile 
than the broad LDA-identified topics, and that they track most closely to the political LDA topics 
(“History” and “Arab world in crisis”). It also shows a series of local spikes in the democracy category 
immediately following the 9/11 attacks, the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the 2006 elections that brought 
Hamas to power in Gaza, and the Arab Spring beginning in early 2011. 
Topic and Subtopic Comparisons: Methods and Results 
Taken together, the LDA and dictionary-based text analysis techniques supply data on the broad 
contours of discussion on the forums as well as the relative occurrence of two substantively interesting 
(and somewhat narrow) sub-topics: Islamism and democracy. Likewise, because the data were gathered 
from a public messageboard, it is possible to generate data at the level of individual posts as well as 
individual posters. This allows me to explore which broad topics are most closely related to each sub-
topic and to find out which broad topics individual posters who discuss Islamism and democracy are also 
likely to talk about. For this stage of the analysis, I employ a series of logistic regression models using the 
broad LDA topics to predict the occurrence of Islamism- and democracy-related themes at both the post 
and poster levels.  
Variables 
At the post level, I use two binary dependent variables generated by the dictionary classification 
script that describe whether each post contains a word associated with either Islamism or democracy. At  
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the poster level, I generated a binary variable that describes whether an individual poster has ever made 
an Islamism- or democracy-related post. 
The relevant independent variables for this analysis are drawn from the document-classification 
scores generated by the LDA models. In order to enhance comparability between scores, I re-scaled all 
values to a theoretical range of 0-100. At the post level, these are the independent variables. At the 
poster level, the independent variables are the mean document-classification scores for each poster 
across all posts that were not classified as containing the sub-topic used as the dependent variable, 
generated after re-scaling the raw values. This construction allows me to see what topics other than 
Islamism or democracy an individual poster invokes. 
All models include a series of controls. At the post level, I control for post length since LDA 
models tend to assign more topics to longer posts. At the poster level, I control for both the mean length 
of a poster’s posts as well as their total number of posts to control for the uneven distribution of posts 
between posters. In all models I include monthly fixed effects to control for unmeasured temporal 
effects. 
Models 
Because all of the outcome variables are binary, I estimate a series of logistic regression models: 
Pr(𝑌) =
1
1 + 𝑒−(𝑈+𝑋𝛽+𝜀)
Where Pr(Y) is the probability of a 1 on the dependent variable, X is a matrix of covariates, β is a vector 
of coefficients, U is a constant intercept term, and ε is an error term. I use robust standard errors in all 
models. At the post-level, standard errors are clustered around the individual poster. 
Regression Results 
Table 10 displays the results of the logistic regression models. Models 1-4 describe the post-
level models. Model 1 shows that Islamism-related language is less likely to appear in conversational 
topics (self-help, storytelling, and addressing the forums), but somewhat more likely to appear in topics 
80 
related to culture and religion (marriage and Qur’anic studies). They are also less likely to appear in 
posts that are largely composed of religious idioms, which tend to be formulaic. Islamism-related topics 
are also slightly more likely to be invoked in posts that score highly on the “Arab world in crisis” topic. 
Model 2 builds on Model 1 by adding the democracy post classification as an independent variable and 
shows that Islamism- and democracy-related terms tend to appear together, although the effect size is 
modest. 
Model 3 demonstrates that, unlike Islamism, democracy-related language is more likely to 
appear in two of the conversational topics – self-help and addressing the forums – but less likely to 
appear in storytelling posts. For self-help, this is likely a result of including the word “freedom” in the 
democracy dictionary, the “addressing the forums” result illustrates the relatively open and democratic 
nature of Majalisna’s forum administration.21 Democracy is also less likely to be present in two of the 
three religious categories. Most importantly, however, is that democracy is substantially more likely to 
be invoked in posts that score high on the political topics, especially the “Arab world in crisis” topic. 
While this is also true of the Islamism sub-topic, the relationship between this LDA topic and the 
presence of democracy-related words is much stronger. This is apparent when comparing the effect of 
moving from the lowest to the highest score on this independent variable on the predicted probabilities 
of any given post containing either an Islamism- or democracy-related word holding all other variables 
constant at their means; moving from the lowest to highest value of the “Arab world in crisis” topic is 
associated with an approximately 900% increase in the predicted probability of a post containing an 
Islamism-related word (from 0.11% to 1.00%) but a 16,000% increase in the predicted probability of a 
post containing a democracy-related word (from 0.62% to 99.67%). Because of the highly negative, 
                                                          
21 Many of these posts, for example, are administrators asking for suggestions and feedback by reminding 
members that they have “rights” and that Majalisna is a “free space” for dialogue. 
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external focus of this topic, this provides evidence that Arabic speakers tend to discuss democracy in 
relation to problematic powerful global actors like the United States.  
Finally, similarly to Model 3, Model 4 indicates that Islamism- and democracy-related terms tend 
to appear together, although the effect size is modest. 
The results of the poster-level regression models (Models 5-8) tell a similar story. Individuals 
who post about Islamism are less likely to invoke some of the conversational topics but, outside of their 
Islamism posts, are no different from other posters in their tendency to discuss religious topics or 
politics. Democracy posters are likewise less likely to make conversational posts, but the results for the 
political topics are mixed. It appears that, aside from their posts that specifically mention a democracy-
related word, democracy posters may be less likely to invoke the more neutral “history” topic than 
other posters, but significantly more likely to invoke the more contentious “Arab world in crisis” theme. 
Moving from the lowest to highest mean value of this variable22 is associated with a nearly 1,700% 
increase in the predicted probability of a poster being a democracy poster (from a 1.2% probability to a 
20.1% probability). Finally, Models 6 and 8 include the dictionary classifications for each of the 
dependent variables and suggest that making Islamism-related posts does not make a poster any more 
or less likely to also post about democracy (and vice versa). 
Discussion and Conclusion 
In the previous chapters, I investigated the correlates and contents of Islamist political 
ideologies among individual Muslims using a combination of survey and cognitive interview data. I found 
that people who hold Islamist political values, such as support for shari’a law and seeking to implement 
an Islamic state, do not systematically object to liberal global norms like democracy, but rather take 
issue with the actors and organizations that promote these norms. This chapter builds on these findings 
by exploring how Muslims discuss these issues online using a combination of dictionary-based and 
                                                          
22 At the poster level, this variable’s empirical range is 0 to 23.84. 
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unsupervised topic modeling text classification techniques on a sample of 214,861 posts taken from the 
Arabic-language messageboard majalisna.com. Results of statistical analyses indicate that: 1) discussion 
of Islamism-related concepts are dispersed among a wide range of topics and 2) discussions of 
democracy and democracy-related concepts like elections tend to be clustered in explicitly political 
topics, and the people who discuss democracy are more likely to discuss international crises, conflicts, 
and conspiracy theories than those who do not. 
Because this study is one of the few “big data” social science studies to analyze Arabic-language 
text, it provides insight into a new cultural context. It outlines some of the contours of the emerging 
Arab online public sphere – an important space for dialogue and discussion in a region of the world that 
is often rife with censorship. Likewise, while most quantitative text analyses in the social sciences deal 
with Tweets or Facebook posts, the current study’s use of data from public online messageboards offers 
three key benefits: 1) messageboards have existed for longer than social media sites like Twitter and 
Facebook and thus provide historical text data over a longer time period, 2) messageboards are more 
anonymous than social media profiles, and thus participants may be more likely to share unpopular or 
potentially dangerous ideas on sites like Majalisna than on Twitter or Facebook, and 3) the long-form 
posting format and public nature of the boards means that total strangers interact on messageboards 
more frequently and in a more nuanced way than they do on Twitter or Facebook, where most 
interactions are between individuals who “friend” or “follow” one another. 
The current study is not without limitations, however. The most pressing limitation is data: 
Majalisna is only one of many international Arabic-language online forums, so it is unclear how well 
results drawn from it are generalizable. Future research should incorporate data from other popular 
forums, like startimes.com, a forum with over 15 million unique posts. Second, while the topics 
identified by the unsupervised LDA models give a broad overview of the kinds of things Majalisna 
members discuss, it remains unclear how model specification might impact the categories and 
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distributions of topics. Thus, following the recommendations of leading machine learning researchers, it 
may be necessary to empirically validate both the relative fit of a number of alternative model 
specifications (Blei et al. 2003; Grimmer and Stewart 2013) as well as the results of the LDA models with 
human coders (Guo et al. 2016). 
While the current study provides additional insight into the content of Islamist ideologies and its 
relationship to global norms like democracy, the results raise a number of additional questions that 
future research should address. First, it would be useful to know not only when Islamism- and 
democracy-related words are used, but also the specific content of these discussions: are 
Islam/democracy considered good or bad, and what are the justifications for these assessments? What 
are the actors associated with each, and how? Second, the causes of the temporal spikes in the political 
topics as well as the Islamism and democracy sub-topics are clear, but the content of those spikes is 
unclear: how do people talk about Islamism/democracy after the September 11th attacks, the 2003 Iraq 
invasion, the 2006 Palestinian elections, and the Arab Spring? Third, it stands to reason that the 
unprecedented rise of the so-called Islamic State has had a significant impact on these discussions. 
The majority of the limitations to this study could be alleviated by employing a team of human 
coders. These coders could validate the results of the LDA models and/or code posts for a number of 
sub-topics and variations on sub-topics to be used in more rigorous supervised text classification models 
like ensemble Bayesian methods or random forest classifiers (Hopkins and King 2010; Montgomery et al. 
2012). Because the documents in question are generally short, unedited natural language texts, hiring a 
team of native Arabic-speaking coders would be relatively inexpensive and possible using funds from 
small grants.
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APPENDIX 1: GLOBAL BOUNDARY INVERSION 
Appendix 1A: Quantitative Data 
 The data for the quantitative analyses were taken from pre-existing sources, and I attempted to 
adhere to the original coding schemes wherever possible. Table 1A.1 describes the coding scheme for 
the Arab Barometer data. In total, I altered the coding for six of the variables in these data. Three of 
these – relprogram, quran, and pray – had their lowest response categories combined because “never” 
was only available in one country. Similarly, educ2 was collapsed into a binary measuring some college 
education because the response categories differed between countries. The two remaining questions – 
gc_illegit and foreign_out – were recoded because many of the response categories did not 
substantively differentiate between respondents. 
 
Table 1A.1: Variables – Arab Barometer 
Stubname Full Question Coding 
divsov “The government and parliament should enact laws in 
accordance with shari’a.” 
1 = Strongly disagree 
2 = Disagree 
3 = Agree 
4 = Strongly agree 
divsov2 “The government and parliament should enact penal laws 
in accordance with shari’a.”  
1 = Strongly disagree 
2 = Disagree 
3 = Agree 
4 = Strongly agree 
divsov3 “The government and parliament should enact personal 
status laws (marriage, divorce) in accordance with shari’a.”  
1 = Strongly disagree 
2 = Disagree 
3 = Agree 
4 = Strongly agree 
divsov4 “The government and parliament should enact inheritance 
laws in accordance with shari’a.”  
1 = Strongly disagree 
2 = Disagree 
3 = Agree 
4 = Strongly agree 
relig_self “Generally speaking, would you describe yourself as…” 1 = Not Religious 
2 = Somewhat religious 
3 = Religious 
relprogram* “Do you watch or listen to religious programs on the radio 
or television?” 
1 = Rarely; Never 
2 = Sometimes 
3 = Most of the time 
4 = Always 
quran* “Do you listen to or read the Qur’an?” 1 = Rarely; Never 
2 = Sometimes 
3 = Most of the time 
4 = Always 
relbooks* “Do read religious books?” 1 = Rarely; Never 
2 = Sometimes 
3 = Most of the time 
4 = Always 
islam_helppoor “To what extent do you think that helping the poor is a 
criterion for an individual’s piety?” 
1 = To a great extent 
2 = To a medium extent 
3 = To a limited extent 
4 = Absolutely irrelevant 
nomusic “To what extent do you think that not listening to music is 
a criterion for an individual’s piety?” 
1 = To a great extent 
2 = To a medium extent 
3 = To a limited extent 
4 = Absolutely irrelevant 
pray_req “To what extent do you think that praying in a mosque is a 
criterion for an individual’s piety?” 
1 = To a great extent 
2 = To a medium extent 
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3 = To a limited extent 
4 = Absolutely irrelevant 
popsov “The government and parliament should enact laws in 
accordance with the wishes of the people.” 
1 = Strongly disagree 
2 = Disagree 
3 = Agree 
4 = Strongly agree 
age Respondent’s age in decades. Continuous 
female Respondent’s sex. 0 = Male 
1 = Female 
educ2* Respondent’s self-reported educational attainment. 0 = No College 
1 = Some college or higher 
outgroup “To what extent do you feel that you are being treated 
equally to other citizens in your country?” 
1 = To a great extent 
2 = To a medium extent 
3 = To a limited extent 
4 = Not at all 
gc_illegit* “Are external demands for reform…” 0 = Acceptable; acceptable with 
conditions 
1 = Unacceptable on principle; 
unacceptable because they are 
harmful to national interests 
gc_closed “It is better for your country…” 0 = To decrease its level of openness to 
the outside world 
1 = To maintain the current level of 
openness to the outside world  
2 = To open up to the outside world to 
a greater extent 
foreign_out* “In your opinion, what is the most important challenge the 
Arab world currently faces?” 
0 = All others 
1 = Curbing foreign interference 
dependency “Foreign interference is an obstacle to reform in your 
country.” 
1 = Strongly disagree 
2 = Disagree 
3 = Agree 
4 = Strongly agree 
women_outwork “A married woman can work outside the home.” 1 = Strongly disagree 
2 = Disagree 
3 = Agree 
4 = Strongly agree 
women_travel “It is permissible for a woman to travel abroad by herself.” 1 = Strongly disagree 
2 = Disagree 
3 = Agree 
4 = Strongly agree 
women_jobs “Men and women should have equal work opportunities.” 1 = Strongly disagree 
2 = Disagree 
3 = Agree 
4 = Strongly agree 
women_judicial “Women can assume judicial positions.” 1 = Strongly disagree 
2 = Disagree 
3 = Agree 
4 = Strongly agree 
women_minister “A woman can become the prime minister or president of a 
Muslim country.” 
1 = Strongly disagree 
2 = Disagree 
3 = Agree 
4 = Strongly agree 
democ_better “A democratic system may have its problems, but it is 
better than other systems.” 
1 = Strongly disagree 
2 = Disagree 
3 = Agree 
4 = Strongly agree 
relig_tolerance “Which members of the following groups would you not 
like to have as neighbors: Followers of other religions.” 
1 = I do not want them to be my 
neighbors 
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2 = I do not object 
race_tolerance “Which members of the following groups would you not 
like to have as neighbors: People of a different race or 
color.” 
1 = I do not want them to be my 
neighbors 
2 = I do not object 
association “Are you a member of a: charitable society; professional 
trade association/trade union; a youth/cultural/sports 
association” 
1 = Yes to any 
2 = No to all 
Note: Recoded variables are marked with an asterisk. 
 
Where possible, I constructed indices where multiple survey items measuring the same attitude exist. 
Table 1A.2 presents the indices, the survey items used to construct them, and Cronbach’s alpha scores 
for the AB dataset.  
 
Table 1A.2: Indices – Arab Barometer 
Index Variable Type Survey Items Cronbach’s Alpha 
Support for Shari’a Dependent divsov, divsov2, divsov3, divsov4 
 
0.8731 
Religiosity Independent relprogram, quran, relbooks 
 
0.7687 
Orthodoxy Independent islam_helppoor, pray_req, nomusic 
 
0.7047 
Women’s Empowerment Independent women_outwork, women_travel, women_jobs, 
women_judicial, women_minister 
0.7996 
 
 Table 1A.3 describes the coding scheme for the World Values Survey data. In total, I altered the 
coding for four variables in these data. First, I recoded the relig_self variable because there were zero 
respondents who described themselves as a “convinced atheist” in the sample. Second, I recoded the 
college variable in order to maximize comparability between the two datasets. Third, I recoded the 
environment variable to include ambiguous or “other” responses as not concerned with the 
environment first and foremost. I recoded the muslimfirst variable because there was only one response 
of substantive interest.  
 
Table 1A.3: Variables – World Values Survey 
Stubname Full Question Coding 
divsov “The government and parliament should implement the laws 
of the shari’a.” 
1 = Strongly disagree 
2 = Disagree 
3 = Neither 
4 = Agree 
5 = Strongly agree 
relig_self* “Would you say that you are…” 0 = Not a religious person, a 
convinced athiest 
1 = A religious person 
services “Apart from weddings and funerals, about how often do you 
attend religious services these days? 
1 = Never 
2 = Less often 
3 = Once a year 
4 = Only on special holy days 
5 = Once a month 
6 = Once a week 
7 = more than once a week 
mosque_moral “Generally speaking, do you think that the religious 
institutions in your country are giving adequate answers to 
moral problems?” 
0 = No 
1 = Yes 
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mosque_social “Generally speaking, do you think that the religious 
institutions in your country are giving adequate answers to 
social problems?” 
0 = No 
1 = Yes 
mosque_family “Generally speaking, do you think that the religious 
institutions in your country are giving adequate answers to 
family problems?” 
0 = No 
1 = Yes 
popsov “The government and parliament should make laws according 
to the people’s wishes” 
1 = Strongly disagree 
2 = Disagree 
3 = Neither 
4 = Agree 
5 = Strongly agree 
age Age in decades. Continuous 
college* Respondent’s self-reported educational attainment. 0 = No college 
1 = Some college or higher 
female Respondent’s sex. 0 = Male 
1 = Female 
women_mother “In your opinion, how important are each of the following 
traits in a woman: being a good mother?” 
1 = Very important 
2 = Somewhat important 
3 = Neither 
4 = A little important 
5 = Not importat at all 
women_wife “In your opinion, how important are each of the following 
traits in a woman: being a good wife?” 
1 = Very important 
2 = Somewhat important 
3 = Neither 
4 = A little important 
5 = Not importat at all 
democ_better “Democracy may have its problems, but it is better than any 
other form of government.” 
1 = Strongly disagree 
2 = Disagree 
3 = Agree 
4 = Strongly agree 
scientism “In the long run, do you think the scientific eadvance we are 
making will help or harm mankind?” 
1 = Will harm 
2 = Some of each 
3 = Will help 
environment* “Here are two statements people sometimes make when 
discussing the environment and economic growth. Which 
comes closer to your own point of view? A. Protecting the 
environment should be given priority, even if it causes slower 
economic growth and some job loss; B. Economic growth and 
creating jobs should be the top priority, even if the 
environment suffers to some extent.” 
0 = Economy growth and protecting 
jobs; Other answer 
1 = Protecting the environment. 
conf_un “I am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, 
could you tell me how much confidence you have in them?” 
1 = None at all 
2 = Not very much 
3 = Quite a lot 
4 = A great deal 
un_aid “I’m going to mention some problems. For each one, would 
you tell me whether you think that policies in this area should 
be decided by the national governments, by the United 
Nations, or by the national governments with UN co-
ordination?: Aid to developing countries.” 
1 = National governments 
2 = National governments, with UN 
coordination 
3 = The United Nations 
un_environ “I’m going to mention some problems. For each one, would 
you tell me whether you think that policies in this area should 
be decided by the national governments, by the United 
Nations, or by the national governments with UN co-
ordination?: Protection of the environment.” 
1 = National governments 
2 = National governments, with UN 
coordination 
3 = The United Nations 
un_refugee “I’m going to mention some problems. For each one, would 
you tell me whether you think that policies in this area should 
be decided by the national governments, by the United 
1 = National governments 
2 = National governments, with UN 
coordination 
3 = The United Nations 
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Nations, or by the national governments with UN co-
ordination?: Refugees.” 
un_peacekeep “I’m going to mention some problems. For each one, would 
you tell me whether you think that policies in this area should 
be decided by the national governments, by the United 
Nations, or by the national governments with UN co-
ordination?: International peacekeeping.” 
1 = National governments 
2 = National governments, with UN 
coordination 
3 = The United Nations 
un_humright “I’m going to mention some problems. For each one, would 
you tell me whether you think that policies in this area should 
be decided by the national governments, by the United 
Nations, or by the national governments with UN co-
ordination?: Human rights.” 
1 = National governments 
2 = National governments, with UN 
coordination 
3 = The United Nations 
muslimfirst* “Which of the following best describes you?” 0 = All others 
1 = “Muslim above all” 
   
Note: Recoded variables are marked with an asterisk. 
 
Where possible, I constructed indices where multiple survey items measuring the same attitude 
exist. Table 1A.4 presents the indices, the survey items used to construct them, and the Cronbach’s 
alpha scores for the WVS dataset. 
 
Table 1A.4: Indices – World Values Survey 
Index Variable Type Survey Items Cronbach’s Alpha 
Orthodoxy Independent mosque_social, mosque_moral, mosque_family 
 
0.7539 
Women’s Empowerment Independent women_mother, women_wife 0.7947 
 
UN Policy Index Independent un_aid, un_environ, un_peacekeep, 
un_refugee, un_humright 
0.6737 
 
Appendix 1B: Quantitative Robustness Checks 
 Because including fixed effects in non-linear regressions is potentially problematic, I also ran a 
series of linear regression models using the WVS data. In order to make the ordinal variable more 
appropriate for a linear regression I applied a series of transformations, ending with a standardized 
reflected square root of the original variable. For individual i in country j, the model is: 
 
𝑌𝑖𝑗 = 𝑈𝑗 +  𝑋𝑖𝑗𝛽 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗  
 
Where 𝑌𝑖𝑗  is the respondent’s score on the transformed support for shari’a item, 𝑋𝑖𝑗  is a matrix of 
individual-level covariates, β is a vector of coefficients, 𝑈𝑗  is a country specific intercept term, and 𝜀𝑖𝑗  is 
an individual error term. Table 1B.1 presents the results of the linear regression models, which are 
substantively very similar to the models in the primary analyses. 
 
Table 1B.1: Fixed Effects Regressions on Support for Shari’a (World Values Survey) 
 Religiosity Orthodoxy Demographics Cultural 
Content 
Boundaries Full 
Religiosity       
 Self-Reported 0.3369*** 
(0.0398) 
    0.2445*** 
(0.0411) 
 Mosque Attendance 0.0229*** 
(0.0041) 
    0.0208*** 
(0.0041) 
 
Orthodoxy 
      
 
 Doctrine Index  0.0935***    0.0907*** 
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(0.0118) (0.0116) 
 Pop. Sovereignty  0.0606*** 
(0.0104) 
   0.0573*** 
(0.0102) 
 
Demographics 
      
 Age   0.0174* 
(0.0080) 
  0.0098 
(0.0078) 
 College   -0.0785** 
(0.0266) 
  -0.0715** 
(0.0258) 
 Female   -0.0609** 
(0.0211) 
  -0.0575** 
(0.0215) 
 
Cultural Content 
      
 Women Empowerment    -0.1258*** 
(0.0114) 
 -0.1157*** 
(0.0117) 
 Democracy    0.0518** 
(0.0164) 
 0.0557*** 
(0.0159) 
 Trust in Science    0.0575** 
(0.0182) 
 0.0363* 
(0.0181) 
 Environmentalism    0.0542* 
(0.0213) 
 0.0501* 
(0.0210) 
 
Boundaries 
      
 UN Confidence     -0.0301** 
(0.0105) 
-0.0389*** 
(0.0104) 
 UN Policy Index     -0.0333** 
(0.0116) 
-0.0274* 
(0.0114) 
 Muslim Identity     0.2330*** 
(0.0251) 
0.2241*** 
(0.0247) 
       
Constant -1.0411*** 
(0.0513) 
-0.8154*** 
(0.0550) 
-0.6040*** 
(0.0423) 
-0.9210*** 
(0.0853) 
-0.5536*** 
(0.1025) 
-1.3694*** 
(0.1054) 
N 7932 7932 7932 7932 7932 7932 
r2 0.1676 0.1671 0.1572 0.1723 0.1675 0.2077 
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 
 
 
Appendix 1C: Qualitative Data 
 I collected in-depth interview data in Tunisia between August 2013 and March 2014 in five cities 
across the country (see Figure 1C.1). I selected respondents using a combination of convenience, 
snowball, and purposive sampling. Respondents ranged in age from 22 to 64 years (mean=33.32), were 
60% men (N=30) and 40% women (N=20), and the vast majority were college educated (80%, N=40). 
Due to the relative difficulty of finding shari’a supporters who were willing to be interviewed by a 
foreign researcher, I went through great effort to oversample self-described Salafists and Islamists. The 
distribution of my interview respondents on the support for shari’a measure is similar to that of the AB 
and WVS datasets, although not quite as dramatically left skewed (see Figure 1C.2). 
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Figure 1C.1: Interview Locations by City 
 
Figure 1C.2: Distribution of Interview Responses for Support for Shari’a Item 
 
Note: This figure describes responses to the support for shari’a item included in the qualitative interview 
questionnaire (“The government and parliament should enact laws in accordance with the shari’a”). This question 
was taken verbatim from the Arab Barometer Survey. 
 
Appendix 1D: Qualitative Robustness Checks 
 I coded the interview data using a coding scheme that grouped respondent justifications for 
supporting shari’a into one or more of the four substantive categories described in the manuscript: 
religiosity, orthodoxy, domestic boundary work, and global boundary work. Figure 1D.1 illustrates the 
frequency with which people who supported shari’a in the closed-ended questionnaire invoked these 
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themes when justifying their support. The main manuscript contains examples for global boundary 
work; here, I will focus on the other three groups. 
 Many of the respondents who invoked the religiosity theme focused on their belief that all 
Muslims support shari’a as a matter of fact. Adel, a 29-year-old secondary school teacher from Bizerte 
and self-described Salafist, said that all Muslims support shari’a because they are “the only people who 
fully give themselves over to the will of God.” Abderrahman, an imam at a prominent mosque in 
Kairouan, explained shari’a similarly: 
 
[The goal of shari’a] is that all of the universe will say one phrase – ‘God is one, we worship one 
God.’ This is the goal of all of existence. The shari’a, the explanation of the word shari’a, it is the 
rules, the applications, the views that serve this goal: the goal of tawhid [monotheism]. Saying 
God is one. Saying this is what makes a person a Muslim. (26, imam khatib, Kairouan) 
 
Others argued that applying the shari’a would make it easier for Muslims to perform their religious 
obligations. Amine said: 
 
Some people say that shari’a would be harmful to women and non-Muslims. This is not true. The 
Prophet (PBUH) lived with all kinds of people. The most important thing is da’wa [preaching] and 
piety. A system based on shari’a would make it easier for everyone to be Muslim. Once someone 
is convinced of the proper Islam, they will begin to make the right choices for themselves and 
society. There will be a revolution of morals. (27, mechanic, Bizerte) 
 
Many extended this line of reasoning, claiming that application of shari’a would lead not only to pious 
citizens but also to pious officials and thus a moral political system. Omar said that implementing shari’a 
would solve 95% of the problems in Tunisia because it would guarantee that “just, loyal, and decent 
people” would be in charge. 
 A number of respondents also gave justifications for their support of shari’a for reasons related 
to an orthodox belief system. These responses typically describe implementing shari’a as an obligation 
that Muslims have to God. Faouzi, for example, said: 
 
Shari’a is about following the words of God and the Qur’an, the Prophet (PBUH) and his 
companions. It is about following what we’ve been told in the Qur’an, really, because the 
Prophet (PBUH) was not out doing things on his own, he was just applying what God revealed to 
him, without arguing and without asking questions. (25, mechanic, Bizerte) 
 
Adel used the example of a technical manual to describe why he supported shari’a: 
 
If you buy a car, it comes with a guide from the people that made it. It has information about the 
car, how it is made and how to use it. Is it possible for you to go to the makers and tell them ‘this 
is wrong’? No, they will laugh at you! Who made it? They made it! With God we have the same 
thing. Can you say God is wrong? No, that is kufr [disbelief]! It wasn’t you that created 
everything, it wasn’t the government that created everything. Cutting hands? Marrying four 
women? Who are we to question this? We just need to do whatever God says. (29, secondary 
school teacher, Bizerte) 
 
Thus, the application of shari’a is required of Muslims because God ordained it so, and humans are 
incapable of changing God’s plan. 
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 Finally, some shari’a supporters indicated that they felt discriminated against and marginalized 
by wider Tunisian society and engaged in boundary work directed at other domestic groups, mainly 
leftist groups. Hamza, a 25-year-old college student living in Tunis, said that shari’a would “protect 
public money from corrupt political parties, like the communist parties.” Aymen, a 27-year-old hardware 
store employee in Bizerte, similarly says that “the people who give a bad impression of shari’a are 
leftists… they are hypocrites.” He also lambastes Islamist political parties for not being authentically 
Islamic by invoking their stance on shari’a: 
 
The people in charge, the people in political parties, they don’t want shari’a. Even the so-called 
Islamist political parties don’t want shari’a. This is in contradiction with what our Prophet (PBUH) 
said, what he told us to do… these so-called Islamist parties make divisions in the population, 
pitting Muslim against Muslim, creating fitna [disunity] by scattering people into shia’at [political 
factions]. God does not like that… they need to return to the Sunnah and the Qur’an. (27, 
hardware store employee, Bizerte). 
 
Others, like Ibrahim, argue that the national media play a key role in oppressing Salafists and others who 
support shari’a: 
 
The solution to all of our problems is easy, we must govern according to the rule of God. 
But really this isn’t easy, we are going to face a lot of struggles trying to do this 
because… the media always gives a bad impression of us, of Salafists. (25, shop owner, 
Bizerte)  
 
Figure 1D.1: Bar Graph of Themes in Respondent Justifications for Supporting Shari’a 
 
Note: This figure shows justifications for respondents who answered “agree” or “strongly agree” to the survey 
question “The government and parliament should enact laws in accordance with the shari’a” (N=26). These themes 
are not mutually exclusive – the majority of responses involve more than one.  
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APPENDIX 2: ISLAMISM AND DEMOCRACY IN THE ARAB ONLINE PUBLIC SPHERE 
 
Appendix 2A: LDA Topic Validation 
Because the text data employed by the current study are in Arabic, I only reported truncated 
validation information in the main text. In this appendix, I give more detailed information on each topic, 
including the most informative features in Arabic, a brief summary of the topic, and a sample post from 
each. 
 
Topic 1: Self-Help 
This topic mostly consists of self-help advice, horoscopes, dream interpretations, and pop 
psychology. There are often book reviews and summaries of blog posts made by psychologists, Islamic 
scholars with an interest in self-improvement, and self-help gurus. Table 2A.1 below illustrates the top 
ten features associated with this topic, a sample word for each feature, and an English translation. Note 
that the reported features are post-normalization, and the letters in red for the sample word were 
added after reading through relevant posts. 
 
Table 2A.1: Topic 1 - Self-Help 
Rank Arabic Root Arabic Word English Word 
1 صخش صخشةي  Personality 
2 لمع لمع Work 
3 دج ودج  To find 
4 سنا إسننا  People / humanity 
5 ملع ملعي  Scientific 
6 سف نسفةي  Psychological 
7 قيقح تقيقح  Realization 
8 ايح ايحة  Life 
9 فرع ت ّرعف  To get to know 
10 سفن سفن Self 
 
Below is a sample post from this topic, dated August 14th 2005 in a thread entitled “The subconscious 
mind is the secret of your power over others and yourself”: 
 
Greetings everyone, I hope you are all doing fine. I am pleased to offer you all a course entitled 
‘Learn the Power of your Subconscious Mind.’ I found it on another forum and I think it’s very 
good. I have personally benefitted from it and I hope you will to. The useful things in this lesson 
are 1) the power that is inside you, 2) how the subconscious mind operates, 3) the ability of your 
subconscious mind to perform miracles, 4) the role of the mind in healing …. 
 
Topic 2: Storytelling 
Posts that score highly on this topic tend to be long-form stories, either fictional (e.g., stories 
about knights fighting dragons or vampire hunters) or dramatized real-life experiences (e.g., stories 
about meeting and becoming friends with a celebrity). The LDA model also included a handful of non-
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story posts containing medical information as high on this topic. Table 2A.2 below illustrates the top ten 
features associated with this topic, a sample word for each feature, and an English translation. 
 
Table 2A.2: Topic 2 - Storytelling 
Rank Arabic Root Arabic Word English Word 
1 ما يأما  Days 
2 يتح تحى  Until 
3 دح اودح  One / only 
4 مو يمو  Day 
5 ءا مءا  Water 
6 دج ودج  To find 
7 رعش رعش To feel 
8 رمع رمع Age 
9 لجر لجر Man 
10 مدنع مدنعا  When / Whenever 
 
Below is a sample post from this topic, dated December 12th 2003 in a thread entitled “The story of a 
Saudi girl in Paris”: 
 
…I went home to relax and about a half hour later there was a knock at my door. I said ‘Who is 
there?’ A man answered but I couldn’t understand what he said, so I got up and opened the 
door. ‘Yes?’ I said. ‘We are detectives, you have to come with us now,’ he replied. ‘Why?’ I asked. 
‘Those are just our orders,’ he replied. I changed my clothes and went with them to the police 
station in Paris… 
 
Topic 3: Addressing the Forums 
This topic consists largely of direct addresses to forum members: asking advice on posting, 
thanking people for posts, or administrators seeking feedback on forum management or reminding 
members of the forum rules. This topic is very common, as many posts begin with phrases like “thank 
you for sharing this” or end with “thank you for reading my post.” Table 2A.3 below illustrates the top 
ten features associated with this topic, a sample word for each feature, and an English translation. 
 
Table 2A.3: Topic 3 - Addressing the forums. 
Rank Arabic Root Arabic Word English Word 
1 ركش ركش Thank 
2 عوضو معوضو  Topic / post 
3 ريخ ريخ Good 
4 رور سرور  Delight / pleasure 
5 ليمج ليمج Beautiful 
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6 روكش روكش Thanks 
7 تخ أتخ  Sister 
8 ملاس ملاس Peace 
9 عءار ارئع  Wonderful 
10 كراش مكراشة  Sharing 
 
Note that the word “sister” (تخأ) appears here because many posts that address the forums address 
“brothers and sisters.” The word “brother” (خأ) was eliminated during the text normalization process 
because it begins with an alef and is only two letters in length. 
 
Below is a sample post from this topic, dated January 2nd 2007 in a thread entitled “The magic recipe for 
a better forum”: 
 
How can we make sure our forum is the best? The solution is simple. First, we must encourage 
new members – surely you can remember the first day that you posted on the forum and hoped 
everyone would respond… Second, before you write a new thread on any given section you 
should respond to two or three other threads at a minimum. This is very important to increase 
communication between members… Third, the most magical thing you can write is ‘thank you 
for posting this thread, may God protect you.’… 
 
Topic 4: Romance 
This topic mostly consists of love stories or people asking for and giving romantic advice. Some 
of the posts that score highly on this topic are also about family-related issues, such as naming children. 
Table 2A.4 below illustrates the top ten features associated with this topic, a sample word for each 
feature, and an English translation. 
 
Table 2A.4: Topic 4 - Romance 
Rank Arabic Root Arabic Word English Word 
1 بح بح Love 
2 ملع ملع To Learn 
3 لوق قال  To say 
4 بلق بلق Heart 
5 دح ودحة  Loneliness 
6 لق لق Say (imperative) 
7 فرع ت ّرعف  To get to know 
8 ول ول If only… 
9 سان سان People 
10 سف نأسف  Selves / souls 
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Below is a sample post from this topic, dated May 9th 2002 in a thread entitled “Love… a lecture with Dr. 
Amrou Khaled”: 
 
Is love an instinct given to human by God? Can a man live without love? Of course we can say 
that everyone has love for our fathers, our mothers, and our sisters, and it is true that this kind of 
love originates from the love of God, but let’s talk about love in a more specific sense, the love 
between men and women. Can humans live without love, an instinct that has existed since the 
creation of Adam? Recall that even though Adam was in paradise, he felt he needed something – 
he needed Eve. This is not a fantasy, it is from the hadith of the Prophet (PBUH)… 
 
Topic 5: Marriage 
This topic deals specifically with marriage. Many of the posts that score high on this topic 
include references to the Qur’an and hadith as well as fatwa on topics related to marriage. To give an 
example, the rights of each spouse under an Islamic marriage is a common sub-topic, as is discussions of 
which people are allowed to see what parts of a woman’s body before and after she is married. While 
this topic is relatively highly correlated with the romance topic (0.41), the feature set is distinct enough 
that the LDA model separated the two. Table 2A.5 below illustrates the top ten features associated with 
this topic, a sample word for each feature, and an English translation. 
 
Table 2A.5: Topic 5 - Marriage 
Rank Arabic Root Arabic Word English Word 
1 ار رىأ  To see 
2 جوز جوز Husband 
3 ثيدح ثيدح Hadith (saying/doing of 
the Prophet) 
4 لجر لجر Man 
5 قح قح Right 
6 لاغ لاغي  Expensive / dear 
7 لوق قال  To say 
8 رم ارمةأ  Woman 
9 ءاسن ءاسن Women 
10 ضع بضع  Some / one another 
 
Note that the stem ضع appears in this topic largely because of a specific linguistic construct: “ مهضعب
 ضعبلا\ ضعبلا مكضعب ” or “one another.”  
 
Below is a sample post from this topic, dated October 17th 2013 in a thread entitled “The reasons for the 
spread of spinsterhood”: 
 
Anything that prevents women from their ability to marry an appropriate suitor must be stopped 
by her guardians. Many times these are foolish arguments given by short-sighted women, who 
say that their suitor is too old, too poor, or a religious hardliner. This is a waste of resources. It is 
irresponsible because it deprives women of their legitimate right to marry at a reasonable age 
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and to be an active participant in creating their community. The creation of a new generation 
depends on women being married at a reasonable age… 
 
It is interesting to note that a good number of the posts that score highly on this topic take a similar 
tone. They often discuss the “rights” of husbands and wives, but these are depicted as lopsided: 
husbands have the “right” to go out in the world and provide for their family, while wives have the 
“right” to get married and have children. There also appears to be a large subset of posts dealing with 
how women can make themselves suitable for marriage. 
 
Topic 6: Qur’anic Studies 
One of the most straightforward topics that the LDA model identified, posts that score highly on 
this topic tend to be Qur’anic exegesis. These posts often include long stretches of Qur’an verses and 
interpretations from both contemporary and historical Islamic scholars. They also include more 
heterodox “folk” interpretations such as numerology. Table 2A.6 below illustrates the top ten features 
associated with this topic, a sample word for each feature, and an English translation. 
 
Table 2A.6: Topic 6 – Qur’anic Studies 
Rank Arabic Root Arabic Word English Word 
1 رو سروة  Qur’an Verse 
2 ارق لارقنآ  The Qur’an 
3 مس إمس  Name 
4 بر بر Lord 
5 ظفح ظفح Keep / Protect 
6 ميرك ميرك Generous 
7 لو ألو  First 
8 ءاش ءاش Will (e.g., God’s) 
9 بولق بولق Hearts 
10 نمحر نمحر Gracious 
 
Note that many of these features are words associated primarily with God (e.g.,  ,مسإنمحرّ,ءاشّ,ظفح ) or 
the Qur’an (e.g., ميركّ,ةروسّ,نآرق) in fixed phrases (e.g., "ميركلاّنآرقلا"). 
 
Below is a sample post from this topic, dated January 12th, 2010 in a thread entitled “The secret of the 
number 7!!!”: 
 
…The number of verses in surat al-fatiHa [the opening verse to the Qur’an] is seven. Seven has a 
special meaning for believers: the number of the heavens (7) the number of Earths (7) the 
number of times believers circumambulate around the Kaaba (7) and travel between Al-Safa and 
Al-Marwah [during Hajj and Umrah] (7) and believers prostrate on seven bones. The Prophet 
(PBUH) mentioned the number seven many times (‘avoid the seven sins’…) and so on. This 
repetition of the number seven is not by accident… 
 
99 
Topic 7: Religious Storytelling 
This topic is quite similar to topic 2, except the stories in the posts that score highly on it tend to 
be religious stories. Some of these stories are straight out of Islamic history, drawn from the Qur’an or 
hadith or even Sufi poetry and legends. Others are fictional dialogues between characters that are 
meant to have a religious meaning, and these dialogues often include the characters quoting Qur’an 
verses and giving examples about how to behave from the life of the Prophet. Table 2A.7 below 
illustrates the top ten features associated with this topic, a sample word for each feature, and an English 
translation. 
 
Table 2A.7: Topic 7 – Religious Storytelling 
Rank Arabic Root Arabic Word English Word 
1 ملس ّ لسم  To grant salvation 
2 يلص لصى  Pray 
3 لوسر لوسر Messenger 
4 يلاع يلاع High 
5 ضر ضرى  To be satisfied 
6 لوق لوق To say 
7 لاص لاصة  Prayer 
8 بن لابني  The Prophet 
9 دبع دبع Servant (of) 
10 ملاس ملاس Peace 
 
As in topic 6, many of these features form fixed phrases that Muslims use when speaking about God, the 
Prophet, and the companions of the Prophet (e.g., "ملسو هيلا الله ىلص").  
 
Below is a sample post from this topic, dated October 4th, 2008 in a thread entitled “Descriptions of the 
Prophet (PBUH)”: 
 
This summary includes the most important physical characteristics of the Prophet. It is good to 
find out more about him because the greater our knowledge is, the stronger our love for him will 
be. Do not let the image of the Prophet die in your mind’s eye!... His face was like the sun and the 
moon, shining and serene. Ka’b bin Malik, may God be pleased with him, said ‘The Prophet’s 
(PBUH) face shone like a piece of the moon’ (Bukhari and Muslim), and Abu Ishaq said: ‘Bara was 
asked whether the face of the Prophet (PBUH) was like a sword. He replied, no, it is like the 
moon.’ (Bukhari)… 
 
Topic 8: Religious Idioms 
This topic consists of fixed-form idioms that Muslims use when praying or when referring to 
specific personalities in Islamic history. Many of the posts that score very highly on topics 6 and 7 also 
score highly on this topic, but the posts that score highest on this topic tend to be strings of phrases 
repeated over and over with no additional text in between. These appear to be public “prayer logs” that 
members use as a form of religious accountability – that is, as a way to incentivize them to say their 
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prayers. Table 2A.8 below illustrates the top ten features associated with this topic, a sample word for 
each feature, and an English translation. 
 
Table 2A.8: Topic 8 – Religious Idioms 
Rank Arabic Root Arabic Word English Word 
1 دمح لادمح  Praise 
2 لص لصى  To Pray 
3 مهل لامهل  O God 
4 را بمراك  Blessed 
5 حب سحبنا  Glory 
6 رفغ رفغ To forgive 
7 محر حريم  Merciful 
8 بحص لاحصابة  Companions of the 
Prophet 
9 هلا الله God 
10 ملس ّ لسم  To grant salvation 
 
Below is a sample post from this topic, dated November 5th, 2005 in a thread entitled “Your daily log of 
prayers for the Prophet Mohammad”: 
 
“O God, bless Mohammad and his kin…” (repeated 100x) 
 
Topic 9: History 
Broadly, this topic consists of posts that have historical information. Many of these posts read 
like Wikipedia pages, recounting important dates and historical facts. Most are expressly interested with 
the history of the Arab world and Islamic history, but many also deal with European, Asian, American, 
and African history. Table 2A.9 below illustrates the top ten features associated with this topic, a sample 
word for each feature, and an English translation. 
 
Table 2A.9: Topic 9 - History 
Rank Arabic Root Arabic Word English Word 
1 لود لود Countries / nations 
2 برع برع Arabs 
3 ملاع ملاع World / globe 
4 دح ولادحة  Unity 
5 لمع لمع Work 
6 ملاسا ملاسا Islam 
7 لو ألو  / ألوى  First 
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8 سيءر رئسي  President 
9 نيد نيد Religion 
10 خيرا تخيرا  History 
 
Below is a sample post from this topic, dated October 14th, 2004 in a thread entitled “The flags of the 
countries of the world”: 
 
You have seen the flags of the countries of the world, but do you know why these countries chose 
the colors of their flags? Do you know what the colors of your own country’s flag mean? If you 
do, there are many around you who do not… After the fall of the Soviet Union, Armenia adopted 
a new flag with three colors. Red stands for the blood that was shed in the past, blue symbolizes 
the Armenian land, and orange signifies the courage of the Armenian people. 
 
Topic 10: Arab World in Crisis 
This topic is one of the most coherent that the LDA model identified, and it emerged in every 
model specification that I tried while conducting this research. It is similar to topic 9 in that it deals with 
history and politics, but it is more specific. Posts that score very highly on this topic tend to be about 
current events, hotspots in the Arab world (e.g., Palestine, Iraq, Lebanon), controversial Islamist 
organizations (e.g., Hamas, Hezbollah, Al-Qa’ida), and powerful global actors (e.g., the UN, the US, EU 
countries, Russia, China). There also tends to be a good deal more commentary and analysis in these 
posts than the topic 9 posts, as well as quite a bit of conspiracy theorizing. Table 2A.10 below illustrates 
the top ten features associated with this topic, a sample word for each feature, and an English 
translation. 
 
Table 2A.10: Topic 10 - Arab World in Crisis 
Rank Arabic Root Arabic Word English Word 
1 برع برع Arabs 
2 قارع لاقارع  Iraq 
3 لتق لتق To kill 
4 رص مرص  Egypt 
5 بعش لابعش  The people 
6 كيرم أكيرما  America 
7 ملاس إملاسي  Islamic 
8 طس لفطسني  Palestine 
9 ليءارسا إارسئلي  Israel 
10 لود لود Countries / Nations 
 
Below is a sample post from this topic, dated March 6th, 2007 in a thread entitled “The reality of mass 
graves and American disinformation (evidence) !!”: 
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I should say in advance that we are against the killing of any human being, no matter their 
nationality, religion, political ideas, and beliefs. The fact that we say this reveals the lie that the 
malevolent American media has spread about the Arab nation. That is why we need to give an 
accurate description of the incidents that led to the creation of these graves. The victims of these 
mass graves are not victims of conscience, ethical or political, or victims of religious or sectarian 
cleansing as is reported by American propaganda. Instead, they are victims of the many wars 
that Iraq has suffered over the years. 
 
Appendix 2B: Dictionary Search Terms 
In order to minimize the number of false negatives returned by the dictionary classification 
script, I ran the regular expression parser using the un-normalized text data. That said, I attempted to 
include a number of stems for each relevant word in order to account for different ways of using these 
words as well as common misspellings (see Table 9 in the main manuscript). Table 2B.1 below provides 
the complete list of search terms in Arabic. 
 
Table 2B.1: Arabic Search Terms 
Sub-Topic Feature (English) Word (Arabic) Search Terms 
Islamism 
shari'a ةعيرشلا ةعرش"ّ"ةعيرش"ّالله"ّ""عئارش  
divine sovereignty ةيمكاح "ةيمكاح" 
Islamic state ةيملاسإّةلود ّ"ةيملاساّةلود"ّ"ةيملاسإّةلود"
"ةيملاسلااّةلودلا"ّ"ةيملاسلإاّةلودلا" 
caliphate ةفلاخ "ةفلاخ" 
caliph ةفيلخلا "ةفيلخلا" 
Democracy 
democracy ةيطارقميدلا ّ"طارقومد"ّ"طارقوميد"ّ"طارقميد"
ّ"يساركميد"ّ"طرقمد"ّ"طارقمد"
"ساركمد"ّ"يساركمد" 
elections تاباختنإ "بختنإ"ّ"بختنا"ّ"باختنإ"ّ"باختنا" 
vote تيوصت "ّ"تيوصت  
ballot عارتقإ "عرتقإ"ّ"عرتقا"ّ"عارتقإ"ّ"عارتقا" 
freedom ةيرح "تايرح"ّ"ةيرح" 
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